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Abstract
Information and communication technologies (ICT) are driving the modern
innovation process. To better understand these dynamics, the current dis-
sertation analyses the interactions between innovation and competition. The
scope of this work can be divided into two areas: The first one deals with
a question of how markets could be organized to produce the most optimal
outcome. The second one analyses the feedback effects of innovative activity
on competition and the organisation of economic activity.
Regarding the impact of competition on innovation, an empirical anal-
ysis reveals that ICT- driven innovations dominate in concentrated indus-
tries, whereas innovations based on other technologies flourish in moder-
ately competitive markets. This suggests that there are some features that
make ICT-enabled innovations exceptional, compared to innovations based
on other technologies. Concerning the impact of innovation on competition,
two findings are worth emphasising. First, as shown in a theoretical analysis,
although profitable from an individual producer’s perspective, the adoption
of a technology increasing product variety across the entire industry erodes
firms’ payoffs. In addition, firms’ decisions with respect to the technology
adoption are not always efficient from the social welfare point of view. Sec-
ond, another empirical analysis included in this work reveals that ICT leads
to more competition and facilitates the emergence of hybrid organization
forms, subject to firm’s and industry’s characteristics.
Although this dissertation reveals only a small piece of the complexity of
the ICT-driven innovation process, it casts some new light on the importance
of market structure for ICT- enabled innovation and the feedback effect of
the technology on firms’ environment. Interestingly, the outcomes of this
thesis show that these interactions are often far from straightforward and in
many cases counterintuitive.
Key words: Competition, innovation, market structure, organisational
forms, Information and Communication Technologies, ICT
Zusammenfassung
Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien (IKT) sind der Antrieb des
modernen Innovationsprozesses. Für besseres Verständnis dieser Dynamik,
analysiert diese Dissertation die Wechselwirkungen zwischen Innovation und
Wettbewerb. Die Arbeit umfasst zwei Teile: Erstens wird die Frage behandelt,
wie die Märkte organisiert werden können, um das optimale Marktergebnis zu
erreichen. Zweitens werden die Rückwirkungen der innovativen Tätigkeit auf
Wettbewerb und auf Organisation der wirtschaftlichen Tätigkeit analysiert.
Betrachtet man den Einfluss von Wettbewerb auf Innovation, zeigt ei-
ne empirische Analyse, dass IKT-getriebene Innovationen in konzentrierten
Industrien vorherrschen. Im Gegensatz dazu gedeihen Innovationen, die auf
anderen Technologien basieren, in eher vollkommenen Märkten. Der Vergleich
suggeriert, dass die IKT-getriebene Innovationen andere Charakteristika auf-
weisen als Innovationen, die auf anderen Technologien basieren. Betrachtet
man die Rückwirkung von Innovation auf Wettbewerb, sind zwei Ergebnisse
wert genannt zu werden. Erstens, obwohl profitabel von der Perspektive ein-
zelner Unternehmen aus, sinkt der Industrieprofit, wenn eine produktvielfalt-
steigernde Technologie durch alle Firmen übernommen wird. Des Weiteren
sind die Entscheidungen der Unternehmen in Bezug auf die Technologiead-
option nicht immer optimal aus Sicht der sozialen Wohlstandsmaximierung.
Zweitens in Bezug auf Organisation der wirtschaftlichen Tätigkeit wird ge-
zeigt, dass IKT sowohl zu mehr Wettbewerb als auch zu der Entstehung von
hybriden Organisationsformen führen kann, was von den jeweiligen Charak-
teristika der Unternehmen abhängt.
Obwohl diese Dissertation nur ein kleines Stück der Komplexität analy-
siert, wirft sie ein neues Licht auf die Zusammenhänge von Marktesstruktur
und Innovation und ihre gegenseitigen Rückwirkungen. Interessanterweise
sind die Ergebnisse weit entfernt von gewohnten Sichtweisen und in vielen
Fällen entgegen der intuitiven Ausgangserwartung.
Schlagwörter: Wettbewerb, Innovation, Markstruktur, Organisations-
formen, Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien, IKT
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Purpose
It is beyond dispute that technological progress stands behind the rapid
evolution of the industrial economies and their economic growth. Modern
societies recognize innovative activity and technological development as a
key element of creating and sustaining their well-being. Today, however, the
capability to innovate becomes more important than ever as it is seen not only
as a means to sustain welfare but, ironically, as a solution to the problems
resulting from the rapid growth as well. Thus, the question of what are the
most optimal conditions for generating optimal economic outcome receives
currently considerable amount of attention from economists, policy makers
and the business world alike. For the same reasons we are interested in how
innovation and technological progress change the environment in which they
take place.
Following the Schumpeterian concept of creative destruction, this thesis
analyses the interdependencies between economic conditions and innovative
activity that has been driven over the last decades by the diffusion of in-
formation and communication technologies (ICT). The research presented in
the following chapters can be divided into two areas. The first area belongs to
the most studied in the field of the industrial organization and includes such
research question as how firms and markets should be organized to produce
the most optimal economic and social outcome. The main issue of interest
1
2concerns the relationship between competition and innovation. The second
area arises from the first one and concentrates on providing an answer to
the question of how innovative activity changes the economic conditions. In
particular, what is the feedback effect of ICT-enabled innovations on post-
innovation competition?
Although the interactions between economic environment and innovation
have been a subject of intensive research, Schumpeter (1942) was first to spell
out the problem of the possible trade-off between static and dynamic effi-
ciency. He claimed that desirable market performance could not be attained
in static competition among producers of existing products whose main role
is to adjust prices and quantities. In his view, only actual or potential compe-
tition of new products or new producers employing novel production methods
drives economic growth. Furthermore, according to Schumpeter, innovating
firms need to use some monopolistic practices that deter imitation and en-
able them to reap profits from their investments in innovative activities. He
argued that large firms with monopoly power are apt to innovate and, there-
fore, their presence benefits the society in the long term. In other words,
monopolies and market power can be justified and sometimes even desired.
For example, monopolistic profits are necessary to secure funds for further
research. The benefits accruing to the society from the new products or
improved production techniques will eventually balance off any welfare loss.
This concept of creative destruction, popularized in economics by Schum-
peter, is based on the assumption that the equilibrium state is being dis-
torted by entrepreneurs who introduce innovations. A successful innovation
replaces existing technologies and changes the economic conditions as well as
the position of incumbent firms. The ultimate remedy to the negative effects
of incumbent’s monopoly power would be competition coming from entrants.
By introducing ideas formulated by evolutionary biologists to the field of
economies, Schumpeter did not only challenge the antitrust orthodoxy but
inspired an intensive debate on the process of technological change and its
consequences. His works became the foundation of evolutionary economics
and endogenous growth theory (Nelson and Nelson (2002)). Evolutionary
economics is based on the idea that market competition functions in a sim-
3ilar way to biological competition. Firms must pass a survival test whose
conditions are imposed by the market (Nelson and Winter (1982)). Although
similarly to neoclassical economics, evolutionary economics uses a different
approach when analysing the interdependencies between competition, tech-
nological development, institutions and resource constraints. Whereas neo-
classical economics models maximization problems of rational individuals,
evolutionary economics is concerned with developing a framework to under-
stand the process of economic change, which is primarily driven by changes
in technology. In a similar way, endogenous growth theory drops the as-
sumption that the economic growth is exogenously determined and treats
the development of new technologies and the accumulation of knowledge as
central to economic growth (Aghion and Howitt (1998)).
In the following, I explain the main aspects of this thesis and its con-
tributions to understanding the inter-relationships between competition and
innovation. Then, I give a short overview of the remaining parts of this work.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis takes the process of the diffusion of ICT as an ongoing exam-
ple of creative destruction at work and acknowledges the fact that there is
a two-way interaction between technology and economic life. On the one
hand, the adoption and diffusion of ICT can be spurred by many drivers
and can have far reaching consequences, on the other hand (Breshnahan and
Trajtenberg (1995), Helpman (1998)). Virtually all economic spheres can be
affected by ICT-induced changes, including innovation dynamics, productiv-
ity and growth, the development of market structures, and the composition of
labour demand. These powerful effects of ICT result from the fact that ICT
is recognized as “general purpose technology” (GPT) (Bresnahan and Tra-
jtenberg (1996), Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005)). GPT is a term describing
a new method of producing and inventing that has an extensive impact on
a wide range of economic activities. Examples of other GPT include steam,
electricity, and internal combustion. Just as other GPTs, ICT enhances pro-
ductivity and improves firm performance by enabling the development of new
4products, cheaper production of existing goods, process re-organization and
organizational change (Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000)).
Due to the fact that there is little evidence on the interdependencies
between ICT-spurred technological change and economic environment, this
thesis provides some new facts on these interactions and helps to under-
stand how competition affects and is affected by the ICT-induced innovative
process. Regarding the results of the following analyses, a number of novel
results can be pointed out:
First, in the analysis of the relationship between competition and inno-
vative activity in chapter 2, I find that ICT-driven innovations dominate in
concentrated markets, whereas their non-ICT counterparts seem to flourish
in moderately competitive markets. However, these relationships become
weaker once industry effects are included. That leads to the conclusion that
innovative activity is not necessarily determined by either market power or
its lack, but instead depends on more subtle characteristics of a firm and
the industry in which it operates and, of course, the technological condi-
tions. There are a number of features that make ICT-enabled innovations
exceptional, compared to other innovations. First, they are derived from a
disruptive technology (Teece (1986)). Second, they are heavy dependent on
information and knowledge, which typically increases fixed cost of innovating
(Carlton and Gertner (2003)). Additional features characteristic to most of
ICT-enabled innovations include the dependency on network effects, criti-
cal mass and switching cost. Although these attributes are often cited to
be particularly important for software and computer hardware products or
telecommunication services, they are not limited to these products only. Con-
siderable dependency on information, network effects, and switching costs
can be observed for other ICT-enabled innovations such as virtual networks
that link firms in a value chain or new products and services invented in the
internet era (Bresnahan and Greenstein (2001), Economides (2003)). Thus,
the uniqueness of ICT-induced innovations can give a hint as to why this
type of innovations dominates in concentrated markets. Because all these
make them very capital- and knowledge-intensive, ICT-enabled innovations
are primarily present in industries in which firms have some market power.
5Second, chapter 3 includes a theoretical analysis of the impact of new tech-
nology on competition and the organization of economic activities in supply
chain. To my best knowledge, this is the first attempt to formalize the intro-
duction of a technology that enables firms to extend their product portfolio
in the vertical context. This analysis shows that, although profitable from
an individual producer’s perspective, the adoption of technologies increasing
product variety across the entire industry erodes firms’ payoffs. In partic-
ular, when products are close substitutes, any benefits stemming from an
increased product variety do not justify investments into flexible technology
by all firms in the industry. The strategic interactions between firms in the
industry lead to excessive investments and, consequently, make firms worse
off. As a result, producers end up in a Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Third, the results of the analysis presented in chapter 4 reveal that ICT is
a technology that enables firms to reduce cost and, in a strategic perspective,
to stimulate the level of competition between their business partners. This
explains the prevailing move to the market as a means of organizing economic
activity. However, despite the technological superiority of ICT networks and
the resulting lower transaction cost, companies’ behaviour with respect to the
sourcing strategy is still not homogeneous. It seems that firm’s structural
characteristics play a significant part in what effect ICT has on their choice
of sourcing options. Consequently, on the one hand, ICT leads to more
competition, and facilitates the emergence of hybrid organization forms that
are based on cooperation and competition, on the other hand.
Regarding the empirical side, there are a few methodological techniques
employed in this work, which are worth mentioning. For example, to analyse
the relationship between competition and innovation, two approaches were
taken. First, I used semi-parametric spline regressions, which allowed me to
drop the linearity assumption and to get an insight into the shape of the
relationship between the two variables. Second, having obtained evidence
supporting the hypothesis that market competition does not have a homo-
geneous effect on different types of innovations, a number of empirical tests
were run in accordance to the Bayesian inference principles. This approach
allows for a high degree of flexibility and at the same time guarantees that
6the results remain robust.
The quality of the empirical analyses was considerably improved by the
use of representative large-scale enterprise survey data that was collected by
the e-Business Watch project, an initiative launched and sponsored by the
European Commission. This is a unique dataset that contains very detailed
and rich information on individual firms’ technology and innovative activity
in a number of European industries. Furthermore, to study the relationship
between competition and innovation, the e-Business Watch data was merged
with selected indicators from the EU KLEMS dataset.
In conclusion, the results of this thesis illustrate the interactions between
competition, the technology adoption and the resulting innovations. Al-
though this work reveals only a small piece of the complexity of the inter-
dependencies between market structure and firms’ behaviour, it casts some
new light on the importance of market structure in the innovative process
and the feedback effect of the technology on firms’ environment. Interest-
ingly, the outcomes of this thesis show that these interactions are often far
from straightforward and in many cases counterintuitive.
1.3 Outline
Besides the introductory chapter, this thesis consists of three chapters. De-
spite the fact that this work is based on three independent essays, it has a
common element that links all of them together. This is the inter-dependency
between competition, ICT as a general purpose technology and innovation.
Chapter 2 deals with the relationship between competition and innova-
tion. Although there is already a lot of literature that aims to identify which
market structure is most conducive to innovation (Kamien and Schwartz
(1982), Cohen and Levin (1989)), there is still a lack of agreement regard-
ing this issue. Thus, Cohen and Levin (1989) point out that the research
objectives should be refocused from the narrowly defined relations to the
fundamental sources of technological change. Similarly, despite his life-long
experience in studying the dependency between market structure and inno-
vation, Scherer (2006) concludes that the most favourable environment for
7technological progress depends upon nuanced circumstances. Thus, the mo-
tivation behind the analysis in chapter 2 is to account for the heterogeneity
of the innovative process and market conditions. The main question of this
analysis is whether there is a relationship between competition and inno-
vation at all and, if yes, whether it varies with the type of innovation or
the technology from which an innovation is derived. In order to answer the
above questions, I make use of four direct measures of innovative: non-ICT-
and ICT-enabled product innovations and non-ICT- and ICT-enabled pro-
cess innovations. The analysis is based on two data sources. The first one,
e-Business Watch, provides data on firms’ innovative activity. The second
one, EU KLEMS, is a source of competition measure. On the empirical side,
I apply Bayesian inference techniques.
Chapter 3 includes a theoretical analysis of the interplay between the
value chain organization, the adoption of flexible production technologies
(FPT) leading to more product variety and welfare implications of such ac-
tions. In order to link the characteristics of FPT with the firm scope and
supplier relations, I develop a model that allows for an analysis of suppli-
ers’ incentives to merge and manufacturers’ decisions regarding the choice
of production technologies that are specific to inputs produced by suppliers.
Choosing FPT over dedicated production technology (DPT) allows a man-
ufacturer to gain access to inputs necessary to extend its product variety.
Two questions are of major importance here: First, how does the structure
of the upstream industry, market size and the degree of product differentia-
tion affect producers’ incentives to adopt FPT? Second, what are the welfare
implications of the decisions regarding investments in the production tech-
nologies under different structures of the upstream industry?
Chapter 4 presents an econometric analysis of the impact of ICT-enabled
procurement networks on the choice of the number of sourcing options. Elec-
tronic procurement as an ICT-enabled innovation has been one of the main
reasons why the character of the supplier-buyer relations has been going
through dramatic changes over the last decades (Skjott-Larsen et al. (2003)).
However, because there are many channels through which electronic procure-
ment affects the value chain interactions, there is little evidence as to what
8are the implications of the introduction of this technology on supplier-buyer
relations and the existing works offer only an incomplete picture. Thus, this
analysis acknowledges that although the main benefits of electronic procure-
ment include the reduction in labour and material costs, sourcing cycle times
and inventory levels (Presutti (2003)), its strategic feature is to support the
use of market mechanisms and to induce price competition among suppliers
(Lancioni et al. (2003)). In order to investigate how electronic procurement
changes companies’ sourcing behaviour, I conduct an econometric analysis
based on the e-Business Watch 2006 survey data.
Chapter 2
Competition and ICT- and
non-ICT innovations
2.1 Introduction
Innovation can pay large dividends for society. As a result, the determinants
of innovative activity have received much attention not only from economists
but also from policy makers and business people. However, although the
problem of the identification of the industry structure that offers greatest in-
centives for innovation has been one of the mostly discussed topics in the field
of industrial organization, so far there is no consensus on how competition
or its lack affects companies’ innovative activity (Gilbert (2006)). The rea-
son for this are different settings and assumptions of the theoretical models
that aim at explaining the relationship between competition and innovation.
Thus, in this analysis we take a different approach. Instead of looking for the
most optimal type of market structure for innovative activity we tackle the
question of how market competition affects different types of innovations.
An important element of our analysis is that we take into account the
contradicting predictions of theoretical models with respect to competition
and firms’ innovative behavior (e.g. Schmutzler (2007)). Rather than select-
ing one type of theoretical model and testing its validity, we acknowledge
that most of the models have clear predictions and that they differ with re-
9
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spect to the assumptions made. To allow for such flexibility, we make use
of data and an empirical method that take into account the nature of the
existing theories. The analysis is based on a unique data set compiling data
on innovative activity and a competition measure at the sectoral level for
a number of European countries. Our data has two significant advantages.
First, it includes the following four direct measures of innovative: non-ICT-
and ICT-enabled product innovations and non-ICT- and ICT-enabled pro-
cess innovations. Thus, in contrast to a large bulk of literature, we use
innovation measures that depict real product and process innovations con-
ducted by firms instead of proxies such as R&D expenditures or the number
of patents typically used. Furthermore, our measures of innovative output
allow us to control for the heterogeneity of innovation output. Due to the
fact that the data used in this analysis provides information on whether an
innovation conducted by a firm was based on information and communica-
tion technology (ICT) or not, we can identify the type of technology that
was used in the innovation process. In other words, given the general pur-
pose character of ICT (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1996)), we are able to
make a distinction between the original technology that an innovation was
derived from. Second, our competition variable is based on the concept of
economic rents, rather than concentration ratio or market share indicators.
Its main advantage over other commonly used indicators is that it does not
require the observation of the firm’s complete market in order to describe
competition. This is particularly important considering that a large share of
companies operate in international markets, which poses considerable limita-
tions on other competition measures. Regarding the empirical methodology,
we apply Bayesian inference techniques. The most important reason for the
choice of Bayesian method is that it enables us to account for the different
predictions of the available theory and, consequently, different solutions. By
reporting posterior distributions of model parameters, we can subsequently
make statements regarding the probability and, consequently, the validity
of each theoretical prediction, instead of rejecting any of the competing hy-
pothesis. Furthermore, Bayesian method is less sensitive to the problems
regarding small sample size.
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As mentioned above, the main motivation of this analysis was to conduct
a comprehensive study that would acknowledge the fact that the relation-
ship between competition and innovation is a multifaceted one (Scherer and
Ross (1990)). This diversity is reflected in the abundance of theoretical mod-
els that deliver contradicting predictions. The source of these inconclusive
claims are the differences related to the assumptions made with respect to the
competition type and technological characteristics. The very first analysis of
market structure and incentives to innovate was conducted by Arrow (1964).
Contradicting Schumpeter (Schumpeter (1942)), he formally advanced the
claim that a newcomer may have greater incentives to innovate than a mo-
nopolistic firm. Arrow’s conclusions were, however, revised by subsequent
works. For example, the way of thinking about competition and innovation
was strongly influenced by Salop (1977) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) who
argued that intense market competition reduces the incentives to innovate.
Similar, Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999) show that industry leading firms
with significant market shares undertake most of the industry innovative ac-
tivities. A more recent work by Aghion et al. (2005) shows that there is no
simple answer to the question of what is the most optimal market structure
for the dynamic efficiency. According to the authors, the final effect of com-
petition on innovation depends on the net effect of competition on the pre-
and post-innovative profits of firms active in the industry. An interesting
overview of a number of theoretical settings and their implications for the
relationship between competition and innovation is presented by Schmutzler
(2007). He shows that the effects of increasing competition on innovation
investments can be positive, negative or non-monotone. In his explanation,
he identifies four different transmission channels by which competition affects
investments and argues that the number of interactions is a source of am-
biguous effects of competition on innovation. Consequently, it is not possible
to formulate a universal model that could explain this relationship.
The results of the empirical analysis match the ambiguity of the results of
the theoretical works. The studies on the relationship between competition
and innovation was pioneered by Frederic M. Scherer. In one of his studies,
Scherer (1965) expressed his disapproval of the idea of monopoly being an
12
apt market structure for technological progress. He concluded that innova-
tive output does not seem to exhibit any positive correlation with market
power or even with profitability before a successful innovation. Later on,
however, Scherer (1967) found that the innovative output tended to increase
with the market concentration level. Explaining the discrepancies between
both studies, he adhered to the complexity of the relationship and the need
to account for inter-industry differences such as technological opportunity.
Eventually, he advanced an argument of a threshold, up to which higher in-
dustry concentration level promotes innovation competition. The hypothesis
of a U-shaped curve, reflecting relations between market power and innova-
tive activity, was partially supported by Comanor (1967) as well. However,
he argued that monopoly power may cause higher research efforts only in in-
dustries in which product differentiation possibilities are limited and that this
relationship does not exist in sectors in which innovation competition plays an
important role. Further studies showed little, if any, causality effect between
increasing market power and innovation. In a more recent study, Geroski
(1994) provided strong support against the concept that monopoly power
has a positive and direct effect on innovation. According to him, incomplete
treatment of the technological opportunity has lead to biased results of the
previous studies. In particular, it seems that the usual methodology of test-
ing the Schumpeterian hypothesis contains a flaw which imparts a distinctly
‘pro-Schumpeterian’ bias to the results. The study showed that industries
with high technological opportunity are characterized by a high concentration
ratio, considerable market size, and higher profitability. Mansfield recapit-
ulated the results of empirical research in the following words: “[a] slight
amount of concentration may promote more rapid invention and innovation
(. . . ). But beyond a moderate amount of concentration, further increases in
concentration do not seem to be associated with more rapid rates of techno-
logical advance(...)”(see Baldwin and Scott, 1987, p. 90). Again, reconciling
conclusion can be found in Aghion et al. (2005) who show that there is an
inverted U-shape relationship between competition and innovation.
Due to the lack of agreement, Cohen and Levin (1989) pointed out that
the research objectives should be refocused from the narrowly defined rela-
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tionships to the fundamental sources of technological change. Consequently,
over the recent decades economists have gradually dispensed with the notions
of complete information, profit maximization and predictability (Aghion and
Howitt (1995)). Accounting for uncertainty and bounded rationality, the
evolutionary approach to economic phenomena has been suggested. Accord-
ing to Gort and Klepper (1982) and Klepper (1996), the innovation process
changes together with industry evolution. For example, at the beginning
of the industry formation, entrants account for a disproportionate share of
product innovations. The diversity of competing versions of the product and
the number of major product innovations tend to reach a peak during the
growth in the number of producers and then fall. Over time, producers de-
vote increasing effort to process relative to product innovation. Towards the
end of an industry life cycle, the advantage of size increases firm’s process
innovation incentives and efforts.
Similar implications for the innovation process as the industry life cycle
has the technological change. For example, in a case study based analysis
of innovation patterns in a variety of industries, Christensen (1997) shows
that industry leaders often reject important inventions and fail to bring them
to the market. Entrepreneurial companies are more likely to exploit these
opportunities. What at first sight looks surprising is easy to explain. Ac-
cording to Arend (1999), entrants and incumbents make rational decisions
to invest in radical innovations or not. The most obvious reason why in-
cumbents choose not to pursue radical innovations is the fact that at the
beginning the market for them is nonexistent or rather small, which makes
such investments unattractive or unprofitable for the incumbent firm. An-
other argument says that the incumbent’s incentives to compete with an
entrant for a new opportunity are rather low (Reinganum (1983)). This
arises due to the cannibalization of its current profits. Incumbents prefer to
use the available technology rather than the future one and, consequently,
devote resources to the current profits rather to the future ones. Entrants,
in contrast, focus on tomorrow’s opportunities and choose to compete in the
future using future technology.
Considering the interrelations between market evolution, technological
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change and the process of innovation, it becomes obvious that any analysis
studying the relationship between competition and innovation should take
into account at least two issues. First, there is a quantitative difference
between product and process innovations. Therefore, one can expect that
the intensity of each type of innovative activity might vary with competition.
Second, technologies evolve and are replaced over the industry life-cycle.
Consequently, the relationship between competition, technological shift and
the resulting change in the innovative process might be of different nature as
compared to a static state.
An example of a technological shift and a transformation of the innova-
tive process is the spread of ICT commonly recognized as a general purpose
technology (GPT). GPT is a term describing a new method of producing and
inventing that has an extensive impact on a wide range of economic activ-
ities (Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005)). Similar to such GPTs as electricity
or steam engine, the diffusion of ICT enhances productivity and improves
firm performance by enabling development of new products, cheaper pro-
duction of existing goods, process re-organization and organizational change
(e.g. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000); Bharadwaj (2000); Köllinger; Nepelski
(2009); Venkatraman (1991)). Thus, the ICT-driven technological change
moves firms towards a new technological trajectory. In view of the above
discussion, it is necessary to ask whether the effect of market competition on
innovation changes with the type of innovation.
The scope of innovative activity covered in this study distinguishes it
from others that tackle the relationship between innovation and competition.
In particular, the inclusion of ICT-enabled innovations makes it absolutely
unique. Thus, it is necessary to explain the character and importance of such
innovations. According to the literature on user adoption of innovation in
ICT, these type of innovations are not primarily cost reducing (Bresnahan
and Greenstein (2001)). The use of ICT primarily enables improvements
in the quality and the reliability of products and services (Brynjolfsson and
Hitt (1996)). Furthermore, novel ICT applications frequently lead to the
introduction of entirely new services and products. Regarding ICT-enabled
process innovations, this is mainly a result of adopting software, which em-
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beds business processes and organizational structures. Thus, the adoption
and business use of ICT applications reinforces the process of process inno-
vation and organizational redesign (Hammer and Champy (1995)).
Our analysis provides evidence that supports the hypothesis that the ef-
fect of market competition on innovation is not alike for all types of innova-
tion. First, we observe an inverse U-shape relationship between competition
and non-ICT-enabled innovations. Second, a clear U-shape dependency can
be observed for ICT-enabled innovations. However, once industry effects
are included in the analysis, the results become considerably weaker. Thus,
to some extent, we provide evidence that is consistent with the seemingly
contradictory predictions of various models and confirm the findings stating
that the effect between competition and innovation is only of minor impor-
tance. As already indicated in previous studies, other factors seem to have
a stronger impact on the innovative activity. Consequently, any implications
for innovation policy and further research in this area should take into ac-
count the type of innovations, the maturity of the industry and the life cycle
of the technology.
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents
the data used and describes the process of data matching. Section 2.3 dis-
cusses the methodology. Section 2.4 presents the results and Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 Data sources and data matching
In our analysis we use two data sources to obtain information on innovation
activity and competition level at the industry level. The first is the e-Business
Watch project and provides measures of innovation activity. The second is
the database developed within the EU KLEMS research project and is a
source of competition measures.
e-Business Watch is an initiative launched by the European Commission
in 2001 with the aim to monitor the adoption, development and impact of
electronic business practices in different sectors of the European economy
(see: www.ebusiness-watch.org). The enterprise surveys conducted within
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the e-Business Watch project focused on the availability and usage of ICT
and the perceived importance and impact of e-business at the company level.
Apart from the numerous questions relating to the usage and relevance of
ICT, all data sets contain background information about each firm, e.g. sec-
tor, country of origin, number of employees, size class and number of estab-
lishments. Since 2003, the respondents were asked about their companies’
innovative activities. Thus, in this work, we use data from the 2003, 2005
and 2006 surveys. The total number of observations in all three data sets
exceeds 26,600 enterprises. Annex gives a detailed description of the surveys
and the data sets used in this study together with an overview of sectors and
countries covered by each individual survey.
EU KLEMS is a research project that analyzes productivity developments
in the European Union at the industry level (see www.euklems.net). One of
its product is a database including measures of economic growth, productiv-
ity, employment creation, capital formation and technological change at the
industry level. The database uses a 63-industry breakdown in accordance to
the NACE classification code for the major of the EU’s 25 Member States
as well as for the US, Japan and Canada, from 1970 onwards. The input
measures include various categories of capital, labour, energy, material and
service inputs. In addition, the data set includes several measures of knowl-
edge creation. The information on value added and labour compensation
enables us to construct a competition measure at the industry level.
In order to match the data from both sources, we followed the sector-
country classification of the e-Business Watch and defined our markets ac-
cordingly. Then, we matched each observation unit from the e-Business
Watch data set with its counterpart in the EU KLEMS data set. Follow-
ing this matching procedure, we obtained observations which can be defined
as single markets, whereas each market is one industry in one country. We
included only sectors that can be characterized as ICT-users and excluded
industries producing ICT equipment and services, such as the ICT manu-
facturing or ICT services industries, both covered by the 2006 survey. The
justification for this was the fact that it is difficult to draw a line between
non-ICT- and ICT-enabled innovations in sectors whose primary products
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are ICT-based, e.g. equipment, services or software.
Due to the fact that sectors covered by the e-Business Watch surveys
were very narrowly defined, in many cases it was not possible to find its
counterpart in the EU KLEMS data set. Therefore, if that was the case, the
sector was excluded from the final analysis. Similarly, some observations were
dropped because of a limited number of countries covered in the EU KLEMS
data set. Eventually, we obtained a sample of 260 individual markets across
the European economy, out of 363 potential observations originally included
in the e-Business Watch database. The final data set includes complete
information on innovative activity and competition level. Table 2.1 shows
the final list of sectors included in the analysis together with the NACE
classification codes in both data sets.
Table 2.1: Mapping datasets
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2.2.1 Measuring innovation
There exists no measure of innovation that permits readily interpretable
cross-industry comparisons (e.g. Cohen and Levin (1989)). Moreover, the
value of innovation is difficult to assess, particularly when the innovation
is embodied in consumer products (Griliches (1979)). In order to overcome
the shortcomings of traditionally applied measures of innovative activity, we
make use of direct measures of innovations. In the e-Business Watch sur-
veys, each respondent was asked a question of whether her company had
introduced substantially improved products or services to its customers dur-
ing the past 12 months prior to the date of the interview. Similarly, survey
participants were also asked if the company had introduced new internal pro-
cesses during the past 12 months. To allow for a comparison with similar
research projects, the questions regarding a firm’s innovative activities were
adopted from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS 2004) to determine the
share of companies that recently introduced product or process innovations.
In addition to the introductory questions on innovation, the interest was also
on the share of innovative activity that is directly related to or enabled by
information and communication technology. Therefore, companies that in-
dicated in the introductory questions that they have conducted innovations
in the past 12 months were asked follow up questions. Consequently, we are
able to distinguish between the following four types of innovations:
• Non-ICT-enabled product innovations,
• ICT-enabled product innovations,
• Non-ICT-enabled process innovations,
• ICT-enabled process innovations.
Because this study is at a sector level, we had to aggregate companie’s an-
swers to the questions of interest. Therefore, in order to compute innovation
rates for each sector-country cell, we first summed up companies’ positive
answers to the questions regarding their innovation activity and divided by
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the number of all firms in the relevant sector-country cell. The final inno-
vation measures are indices for each type of innovation that can take any
value between 0 and 1. If the value of an index is 0, none of the companies
belonging to a certain market covered by the survey has conducted any of the
relevant innovation. In contrast, if an index takes value of 1, it means that
all companies in the market have introduced a particular type of innovation.
As in other studies, our measures suffer from some limitations. First, we
need to rely on respondents’ perceptions. Second, we are not able to quantify
the value of different innovations. Nevertheless, compared to commonly used
innovations measures, such as the number of patents or R&D spending, the
most obvious advantage of our innovations indicators is the fact that we use a
direct measure of innovative activity that is related to the innovative output.
Furthermore, we are able to control for the heterogeneity of innovation type.
The latter is decisive for obtaining a consistent picture of the relationship
between competition and firms’ innovative activity type, which is a distinct
feature of this study.
2.2.2 Measuring competition
The measurement of profits and consequently market competition at the
macroeconomic level is subject to a high degree of uncertainty and may also
reflect measurement problems associated with other economic variables. Em-
pirical studies analyzing the relationship between competition and innovation
are marked by considerable deficiencies in capturing the level of competition
(Cohen and Levin (1989)). The most important problem of these studies was
the choice of an appropriate indicator of market level competition and find-
ing empirical data that could allow for an extensive study of the issue. Thus,
the measure of competition applied in this study is based on the concept
of economic rents, rather than concentration ratio or market share indica-
tors. One problem with applying a measure of economic rents as a proxy for
market power is that a high gross margin is a natural feature of dynamic,
innovation-driven industries and its mere existence is not a basis to conclude
that there is monopolization (Geroski (1994)). Despite this limitation, a
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measure of market competition based on economic rents has some straight-
forward advantages over other indicators, such as market shares or Herfindal
index, commonly used in studies of competition and innovation. Computing
economic rents does not require the observation of the firm’s complete market
in order to describe competition. This is particularly important considering
that a large share of companies operate in international markets. In such
cases, traditional market competition measures quickly reach their limita-
tions. Thus, as in Aghion et al. (2005), the Lerner index is very attractive
as a measure of market competition. However, given that the direct empir-
ical measurement of the Lerner index is quite difficult since firms’ marginal
costs are not observable, we make use of gross margin as a proxy of market
competition. The gross margin is defined as the ratio of sales minus cost of
goods sold to sales (Gitman (1994)).
In order to create a proxy for a gross margin at the industry level by
using the EU KLEMS data, we define our measure of competition as the
difference between value added and labour compensation as a proportion of
value added, i.e.:
GMij =
V Aij − LCij
V Aij
, (2.1)
where LCij is the labour compensation and V Aij is total value added of
industry j in country i. Examples of using the concept of gross margin
as a measure of competition include Cowley, P.R. (1985), Holdren (1965),
Livingston and Levitt (1959) and Nevo (2001) and a similar approach to the
measurement of competition by using macroeconomic data can be found in
Crespi and Patel (2007) and ECB (2006). To make the interpretation of the
following analysis more intuitive, we use
cij = 1−GMij, (2.2)
where cij stands for competition level in country i and industry j. The values
of cij can range between 0 and 1 and it can be interpreted in a reverse way
to the Lerner index. As cij increases, so does the competition level.
In order to reduce the problem of endogeneity, we lagged the data on
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competition by two periods relatively to the observation on innovation. Thus,
as companies were asked about innovation activity in the last 12 months
before the survey, the information on competition level comes from at least a
year before any innovation took place. For example, the data from the 2003
survey was matched with the EU KLEMS data from 2001.
2.3 Method
2.3.1 Empirical model
The main question of the current analysis is what kind of relationship exists
between innovation and competition, i.e. what is the shape of g(cij)? In
contrast to previous studies discussed above, we make a qualitative distinc-
tion between different types of innovation. Thus, for each type of innovative
activity we model innovation intensity in country i and industry j in the
following way:
Ikij = α + g(cij) + βxj + εij (2.3)
where Ikij denotes innovation rate of innovation type k = 1, ..., 4, i.e. non-
ICT-enabled and ICT-enabled product and process innovations, α is a con-
stant and xj is a complete set of industry dummy variables. Following other
studies (e.g. Aghion (2005)), we refrain from imposing any particular form
of g(cij). Instead, we allow for a flexible functional form of the dependency
between innovation and competition. In the proceeding section we make use
of visual data analysis techniques, which will allow us to identify the shape
of g(cij).
An important concern regarding the model specified above is the problem
of endogeneity (see, for example, Nepelski, 2003). It is a well known fact that
there is a two-way causality effect between market structure or market power
and innovation. In other words, just as competition influences the intensity
of innovative behavior, innovation influences market competition. Thus, in
order to minimize the endogeneity problem, data on competition was lagged
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by two periods, relatively to the data on innovation.
A number of studies shows that once additional variables are introduced
the effect of competition on innovation activity diminishes or disappears com-
pletely (see, for example, Geroski (1994)). Thus, in order to account for other
factors that might have an influence not only on the innovation intensity but
also on the type of innovations, we control for industry effects by including
sector dummies in one of the specifications.
2.3.2 Bayesian method
The literature survey presented above reveals that the economic theory of
innovation and competition is very inconclusive and, depending on the as-
sumptions, leads to different conclusions. Thus, instead of asking what is
the optimal level of competition for innovative output, our analysis focuses
on how the impact of competition on innovation changes subject to the type
of innovation. The main purpose of this analysis is to operationalize and
validate the existing pieces of seemingly contradicting hypotheses in order
to obtain a consistent picture of the relationship between competition and
innovative activity.
A logical step in reexamining this issue is the choice of an appropriate
empirical method, which can take into account the nature of the existing
theories. It is evident that the difference in theoretical conclusions stems
from the assumptions made with respect to the characteristics of innovation
or technology used. Thus, an appropriate method should allow for a study of
innovation and technological phenomena, as they can determine the impact
of competition on innovative activity. However, most of the empirical stud-
ies in this area use some variations of regression analysis estimated by using
traditional statistical techniques (for a literature overview see, for example,
Kamien and Schwartz (1982) or Baldwin and Scott (1987)). The major focus
of these studies is to test whether there is a relationship between competition
and innovation measured by an aggregated measure such as R&D expendi-
tures or the number of patents. Consequently, the results of these studies
indicate only that, on average, competition negatively or positively affects
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the studied measure of innovation and they do not allow to make any com-
ment with respect to a specific probability that such a relationship exists for
a particular type of innovation. In order to fill this gap, we propose Bayesian
inference.
The principles of Bayesian interference
The Bayesian approach is characterized by the use of external information
sources, which is called prior information. This information is usually cap-
tured in terms of probability distribution based on previous studies or his-
torical information. Despite its convenience of use and intuitive presentation
of results, Bayesian methods have become widely used only in the last two
decades. Until recently, mainly due to computational requirements, there
were only few classes of models for which the posterior could be computed.
Furthermore, many researchers disputed the quality of an approach in which
subjective prior information is used. To tackle this problem and to increase
the robustness of the results, most of the analyses include various assump-
tions regarding the priors.
In addition, the widespread use of such simulation methods as Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) eliminated most of the computational obstacles
for a number of models and reduced the concern of the influence of the prior
on the coefficient estimates. In particular, the possibility of conducting a
large number of simulations considerably reduced the influence of priors on
the final results. As a result, Bayesian methods have been intensively used in
a number of disciplines. Some examples from the economics studies in which
Bayesian inference techniques were used are Fryar, Arnold and Dunn (1988)
and Mountain and Illman (1995). Applications in other disciplines, such as
management, include, among others, Hansen et al. (2004), Block and Thams
(2007). Furthermore, an overview of studies in marketing, in which Bayesian
techniques were used, can be found in Rossi et al. (2003).
All Bayesian methods rely on Bayes’ theorem of probability theory (Lan-
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caster, (2004)), which can be expressed as
Pr(θ | y) = Pr(y | θ) Pr(θ)Pr(y) , (2.4)
where θ represents the set of unknown parameters, and y represents the
observed data. Pr(θ) is the prior distribution of the unknown parameters.
Pr(y | θ) is the likelihood function, which is the probability of the data y given
θ. Pr(y) is the marginal distribution of the data, and Pr(θ | y) represents
the posterior distribution, which is the probability of the parameter θ given
the data y.
When testing a hypothesized relationship between two variables, Bayesian
analysis proceeds in the following steps. First, a priori beliefs about the
relationship of interest, i.e. Pr(θ), are formulated. Next, a probability of
occurrence of the data given these beliefs, i.e. Pr(y | θ), is assumed. In
the second step, data is used to update these beliefs. The result is the
posterior distribution, i.e. Pr(θ | y), of all parameters included in the model
specification. Thus, Bayesian inference allows for statements in terms of
likely and unlikely parameter values or effects on the dependent variable.
In practice, Bayesian probability statements regarding the parameters
conditional on the data are often interpreted in a similar way to classical
confidence statements about the probability of random intervals covering the
true parameter value. This is however not correct (Sims (1988); Sims and
Uhling (1991)). According to the frequentists approach, a population mean is
not known, but can be estimated from a sample. Thus, by knowing or assum-
ing the distribution of the sample mean, confidence interval is constructed
that is centred at the sample mean. Then, the only statement that can be
made is that 95% or 90%, accuracy level depends on arbitrary preferences,
of similar intervals would contain the population mean, if each interval was
constructed from random samples. In contrast, the Bayesian approach pro-
ceeds by constructing a credible interval that is centered around the sample
mean. Eventually, by using the Bayesian approach, one can state that there
is, for example, 95% or 90% probability that this interval contains the mean.
Another implication of Bayesian econometrics is that it is less concerned
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with the sampling issue, compared to the frequentist approach. Instead,
Bayesian econometrics rely on the data at hand. This brings the focus of
the analysis to more fundamental questions like, for example, what is the
relation between the available data and the model or how to deal with the
discrepancies between the empirical results and what the theory suggests?
These characteristics of Bayesian inference have some clear advantages
for our analysis. First, we do not assume that there are any true and fixed
coefficients, which allows us to account for the differences in the dependency
of innovative activity on competition. This is useful because the theory de-
scribing the relationship between competition and innovation is far from be-
ing consistent and includes competing hypotheses. Bayesian analysis states
the probability or the extent to what a particular hypotheses can be con-
firmed by the observations. Consequently, it allows us to determine which
hypothesis describes our data with a higher probability, instead of rejecting
any hypotheses as being not relevant at all.
Bayesian calculations and Marcov chain Monte Carlo simulation
As mentioned above, one of the main reasons for the late take-off of the
Bayesian techniques use was the computational difficulty. The joint posterior
distribution, i.e. Pr(θ | y), is in many situation hundred- or thousand-fold
dimensional, which makes it very complex and unavailable in closed form
(Lunn et al. (2000)). As it is shown in the next section, Bayesian inference
involves the estimation of various summary statistics of the posterior distri-
butions, such as mean, standard deviation or quantiles. In order to obtain
these measures, one needs to integrate functions that involve (θ | y) with
respect to θ, which considerably limits the use of Bayesian method. MCMC
simulation allows one to overcome this problem, i.e. it substitutes for multi-
dimensional integration as a means to parameter estimation (e.g. Chib and
Greenberg (1996) and Kloek and van Dijk (1978)).
In Bayesian interference, MCMC simulation methods are used to evaluate
integrals from a Marcov chain that is constructed in a way that its stationary
distribution is the posterior. For that purpose, there are two commonly used
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simulation algorithms: Gibbs and Metropolis sampler (Lancaster (2004)).
Both algorithms proceeds by iterative simulation from the full conditional
distributions of each unknown stochastic quantities taking into account the
current values of all other terms of the model. The Gibbs sampler is imple-
mented in the WinBUGS algorithm (Lunn et al. (2000)), which was used to
conduct computation included in the current analysis.
2.4 Empirical analysis
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.2 shows mean values of innovation rates for each type of innovation
activity and competition levels broken down by sectors. Regarding process
innovation, 14% of all process innovations were not ICT-enabled and only
24% were in some way driven by ICT. Such discrepancy does not exist in the
case of product innovations. There are however significant variations in the
type of innovation activity between industries. For example, whereas in the
telecommunication sector nearly one half of all product innovations were en-
abled by ICT, in the construction or pharmaceutical sectors such innovations
accounted for only around 10% of all product innovations. Similar patterns
can be observed for process innovations. Furthermore, the large value of
standard deviations and the discrepancies between minimal and maximum
values of all innovation measures indicate that there are considerable differ-
ences between the markets (see table 2.8, Annex). To some extent, this can
be explained by the discrepancies in the use of ICT across sectors. At the
same time, however, this is also a reflection of differences in the demand for
various types of technologies that firms use and technological regimes they
operate in. This indicates also to what extent new technologies, such as
ICT, can be used in different sectors to introduce new products or improve
production processes.
Regarding competition levels, it can be seen that, on average, the telecom-
munication and chemical industries are the least competitive. On the other
extreme, the hospital activities and shipbuilding sectors exhibit the highest
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
levels of competition within the studied sample. A closer look at the detailed
statistics reveals that the competition level strongly varies in our sample (see
table 2.8, Annex). Although the mean and median values are slightly higher
than 0.5, the minimum and maximum values, c = 0.11 and c = 0.97 respec-
tively, indicate that our sample includes both types of markets, i.e. nearly
monopolies and perfectly competitive markets.
Some insights into the relationship between competition and innovation
activity delivers the analysis of the correlation coefficients (see table 2.9, An-
nex).Whereas there is a positive, though not significant, correlation between
competition and both non-ICT-enabled innovation types, the reverse is true
for ICT-enabled innovations. Both types of ICT-enabled innovations are
negatively correlated with the competition measure. Taking all these facts
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together, it can be assumed that an increasing market competition decreases
firms’ propensity to adopt ICT tools and, as a result, to use ICT in their
innovation process. Considering the potential problem of multicollinearity,
the values of correaltion cofficients are relatively moderate. This indicates
that the analysis does not suffer from serious multicollinearity problem.
2.4.2 Univariate analysis
Before proceeding with a regression analysis, we start with exploring the rela-
tionship between competition and all four types of innovations in a univariate
analysis by inspecting a series of data plots. For each type of innovation we
illustrate the dependency between competition and innovation rate by fit-
ting a median spline function. A median spline function is a semiparametric
method that aims at fitting a function that matches the relationship between
the dependent and independent variables (Smith (1979)). This is done in two
steps. First, the independent variable is split into equally spaced intervals.
As the results of alternative set ups were qualitatively not different, in the
following we present the case where the number of intervals is equal to 5.
Second, cross medians are calculated and used as knots to fit a cubic spline.
The resulting spline is graphed as a line plot. By using such a method, we can
get a first insight into the shape of the function describing the dependency
between competition and all four innovation types.
Figure 2.1 shows the results of spline estimations. The shape of these
curves indicates that there is a considerable heterogeneity across different
types of innovation with respect to competition. On the one hand, we can
observe a positive relation between non-ICT-enabled innovation. Although
far from an inverted U shape, the lines indicate that the propensity to con-
duct both product and process non-ICT-enabled innovations increases at a
decreasing rate with the competition level. This reminds of the results ob-
tained in some of the previous studies (see for example Scherer (1967) and
Aghion et al. (2005)). On the other hand, however, when analyzing ICT-
enabled innovations, it is clear to see that there is a negative relationship
between innovative activity and competition. For both types of innovation,
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the highest rate of innovative activity can be observed in the least competitive
markets. Then, as competition increases, the innovative activity decreases
at an increasing rate to reach its minimum between .5 and .7 and to increase
slightly in the region of the highest competition.
Figure 2.1: Innovation and competition, semiparametric estimation (median
splines)
Similar to Aghion et al. (2005), we can conclude that the relationship
between innovation and competition is not linear. However, once we can
control for the type of innovation, it becomes evident that for some types
of innovation, non-ICT-enabled ones, the function is concave and for others,
ICT-enabled ones, it is convex. Because we do not control for other factors
that might influence firms’ innovative behavior, the above results are only
approximations of the possible relationships between different types of inno-
vation and competition. Thus, we now proceed to a more thorough analysis
in which we estimate a number of models in which we control for other fac-
tors that might influence the innovative process. Furthermore, by including
additional variables, we want to test the strength of the relations established
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above.
2.4.3 Bayesian estimations
Taking into account the results of the spline analysis (figure 2.1), we start
the examination of the relationship between competition and various types
of innovation by estimating three models. First, we start with a basic model
in which function g(cij) is linear. In order to focus only on the dependency
between the two variables of interest, we do not include sector dummies.
Thus, the first equation to be estimated can be expressed by
Ikij = α + β1cij + εij (2.5)
where Ikij denotes innovation rate of innovation type, k = 1, ..., 4, α is a
constant, cij is our measure of competition and εij represents an error term.
In the second model, following the observation in the previous section (figure
2.1), we relax the assumption that there is a linear relationship between
competition and innovative activity. Consequently, in the next analysis, we
want to estimate a model in which g(cij) takes a quadratic form, i.e. g(cij) =
β1cij + β2c2ij. Our last specification goes beyond examining the relationship
between competition and innovation and includes sector effects as well.
All priors for the model parameters carry little information, i.e. they are
assumed to be normally distributed with µ = 0 and τ = 0.001. In other
words, in order not to influence the results by assumptions on priors, we
state that there is no relationship between the dependent and independent
variables. The motivation behind using such a conservative approach are
varying theoretical predictions with respect to the relationship between our
two variables and the first results of the spline analysis. Such prior speci-
fication ensures that we eliminate the bias towards any of the hypotheses.
The initial state of no dependency is further validated in the regression. Any
deviation from the initial assumptions can be interpreted as evidence for the
presence of some dependency between the variables of interest.
To estimate the three models, all computations were done by using MCMC
simulation method. The number of draws was set at 11,000 and the first 1,000
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Figure 2.2: The effect of competition on innovation: Basic specification,
Bayesian estimation
draws were discarded.
One of the main advantages of the Bayesian estimation is that it provides
information about the posterior distributions of each model parameter, which
contains more information than a single metric reported by traditional tech-
niques. These distributions can be of course presented in a graphical way,
making the interpretation of the results even more intuitive. Figure 2.2 shows
posterior distributions of competition variable estimated for the basic model
for each type of innovation. Regarding non-ICT-enabled product innova-
tions, over 90% of the surface of the distribution function lies to the right
from zero. This represents the probability of a positive effect of competi-
tion on this particular type of innovations. The remaining part of the curve,
to the left from zero, shows the probability of competition having a nega-
tive effect on non-ICT-enabled product innovations. In other words, there
is over 90% probability that competition has a positive effect on non-ICT-
enabled product innovations. A similar conclusion can be made with respect
to non-ICT-enabled process innovations. Turning to ICT-enabled innova-
tions, however, it can be seen that a reverse pattern can be observed. Both
posterior distribution curves lie to the left from zero, which suggests that
there is a negative relationship between competition and innovations derived
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from ICT. These results are consistent with the outcomes of the univariate
analysis in previous section.
Figure 2.3: The effect of competition on innovation by innovation type:
Qadratic specification, Bayesian estimation
Along graphical presentation, the results of Bayesian estimation can be
presented in a conventional way by using metrics as well. Table 2.3 presents
the distributions of posteriors for each parameter across the three models.
For each posterior distribution, five quantiles of the probability density func-
tions are reported, i.e. 5%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 95%. Regarding the basic
estimation, it can be seen that the probability that competition positively
influences the likelihood of introducing non-ICT-enabled product innovation
case is over 0.9. In contrast, the opposite can be said about ICT-enabled
product innovations. There, it can be seen that there it is certain that
increasing competition has a negative implication for the intensity of ICT-
enabled product innovations. Regarding process innovations, we can again
see the same pattern as above. Whereas there is a large probability of a pos-
itive impact of competition on non-ICT-enabled innovations, the opposite
effect can be observed for ICT-enabled ones.
Regarding the second specification, in which g(cij) = β1cij + β2c2ij, it
can be seen that despite some changes in the coefficient values, there are
no strong qualitative deviations from the previous observations (see figure
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Figure 2.4: The effect of competition on innovation by innovation type:
Qadratic specification with industry effects, Bayesian estimation
2.3 and table 2.3, second column). In particular, the results for both types
of product innovations remain unchanged and we can still observe a clear
negative (positive) impact of competition on (non)-ICT-enabled innovations.
There is, however, a small difference in the way the competition coefficient
reacts to the inclusion of the quadratic term. Whereas, the duality of the
impact of competition on product innovations becomes even more polarized,
its effect on process innovations becomes less heterogeneous than before.
Regarding the coefficient values of the quadratic term, consistently with the
previous observation reported in figure 2.1, we can observe that the rate
of non-ICT-enabled innovations increases at a decreasing rate and that the
reverse holds for ICT-enabled innovations.
Turning to the results of the last specification, the posterior distribution
curves are shown in figure 2.4 and the values of the median and individual
quantiles in the last column of table 2.3. It can be seen that the impact of
competition on any type of innovative activity becomes considerably weaker
once we include industry effects. In particular, in contrast to product in-
novations, the discrepancy in the impact of competition on different types
of process innovations diminishes. The shape of the density curves of the
competition variable suggests that the areas indicating positive and negative
34
Table 2.3: Competition and innovation; Bayesian estimations
relationship are roughly equal. In other words, the probability of a positive
vs. negative effect of competition on both types of process innovations is
equal. It has to be noted that this is different from saying, as in a classi-
cal approach, that there is no effect at all. Thus, at this example it becomes
straightforward that the Bayesian methodology delivers a considerably larger
amount of information than single metrics reported in classical inference. Al-
though smaller, the drop in the competition coefficient value in both product
innovations specifications does not allow us to make any clear conclusion on
the effect of competition on product innovation. The different signs of com-
petition coefficients still remain, but the strength of this relationship becomes
much weaker. With respect to the quadratic term of competition variable,
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it can be said that the inverted U shape established in the first regression
remains visible for non-ICT-enabled innovations. For the other type of in-
novation, the inclusion of additional control variables centres the posterior
distribution function around zero.
To some extent, the above results are consistent with the findings of pre-
vious studies (e.g. Scherer (1965), Cohen and Levin (1989), Geroski (1994)).
Although at a first glance one is able to establish some relationship between
competition and innovative activity, once controlled for other elements of
technology or industry environment, the initial findings become considerably
weaker. An important insight of this study is, however, the finding that, if
any, there is no homogeneous relationship between competition and in par-
ticular product innovations derived from different technologies. Here, this
contrast was demonstrated for ICT- and non-ICT-enabled innovations.
2.5 Conclusions
Concluding, a detailed analysis that takes into account the heterogeneity of
innovation activity reveals that there is no simple answer to the question
of what is the optimal market structure or competition level for innovation.
The results indicate that the statement that there is an inverted U-shape
relationship between innovation and competition is only partially true. Such
a relation holds only for some types of innovation, e.g. non-ICT-based inno-
vations. For other types of innovations, for example ICT-based innovations,
a negative impact of increasing competition on innovative activity can be
observed. Consequently, in light of the results of the previous studies, these
outcomes cast completely new light on the relationship between innovation
and competition. However, similar to some previous studies, our results lead
to the conclusion that it is not the competition level that primarily affects
innovation activity. As indicated before (e.g. Kamien and Schwartz (1982);
Cohen and Levin (1989)), these are other technology- and industry-related
elements that influence firms’ incentives to innovate.
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2.6 Annex: Data and variables
2.6.1 e-Business Watch surveys
e-Business Watch is an observatory initiative launched by the European Com-
mission in late 2001. The e-Business Watch monitors the adoption, develop-
ment and impact of electronic business practices in different sectors of the
European economy. The purpose of the project is to provide reliable and
methodically consistent empirical information about the extent, scope, and
factors affecting the speed of e-business development at the sector level in an
internationally comparative framework, information which have previously
not been available from official statistics.
Until the end of 2007, the e-Business Watch initiative had conducted five
large scale enterprise survey rounds. Each survey had a different coverage
of industrial sectors and countries. The surveys are based on independently
drawn random samples from pre-specified country-sector combinations, strat-
ified by three enterprise size classes (less than 49 employees, 50-250 employ-
ees, or more than 250 employees) to enable a representative representation of
the respective country-sector findings. A consistent survey method was used,
interviewing decision makers in companies (e.g. IT managers, managing di-
rectors or the owner) by computer-aided telephone interviews (CATI). Each
interview collected basic information about the company, including confirma-
tion of sector membership, number of employees, number of establishments,
and basic financial information such as turnover development. The major-
ity of questions related to the availability and usage of various ICT and
e-business technologies.
During the course of the project, changes have also been made to the
questionnaire that was used for the surveys (see: www.ebusiness-watch.org).
These changes partially reflected prior experience with survey results, identi-
fication of additional aspects that deserved more attention, but also changes
in the technological environment due to newly emerging trends that needed
to be reflected in the questionnaire. The implemented changes led to incon-
sistencies between the surveys, which makes them difficult to compare. Only
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some questions remained unchanged over the entire project life cycle. Thus,
in this study we use data from three surveys, i.e. the Nov/Dec 2003, 2005
and 2006 surveys.
Table 2.4: Country-sector coverage e-Business W@tch survey Nov/Dec 2003
The Nov/Dec 2003 survey covered ten sectors in 25 European countries.
In sum, the data set contains 7,302 valid observations. Regarding the geo-
graphical scope of the survey, 4,670 were conducted in the old EU and Nor-
way and the remaining 2,632 in the Acceding Countries. Within each sector,
sampling was adjusted according to the relative size of sub-sectors measured
by value-added. Thus, sub-sectors with a relatively larger share of contribu-
tion to national GDP were included with a proportionately larger number
of interviews, allowing to get an approximately representative picture at the
country-sector level. Table 2.4 shows the number of successfully completed
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interviews in each country-sector cell for the e-Business Watch survey which
was carried out in Nov/Dec 2003. All 10 sectors were covered only in the
five largest European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK)
and two accessing countries (Estonia and Poland). Consequently, only these
seven countries which exhibit a complete and homogeneous sector coverage
that enables cross-country and cross-sector comparisons.
Table 2.5: Country-sector coverage e-Business W@tch survey 2005
The e-Business Survey 2005, which was the third survey after those of
2002 and 2003, had a scope of 5,218 telephone interviews with decision-
makers in enterprises from seven EU countries. In contrast to the surveys
of 2002 and 2003, the survey of 2005 considered only companies that used
computers. Thus, the highest level of the population ("base") was the set of
all computer-using enterprises which were active within the national territory
of one of the respective countries, and which had their primary business
activity in one of the sectors specified by NACE Rev. 1.1 categories. The
sample drawn was a random sample of companies from the respective sector
population in each of the seven countries, with the objective of fulfilling
strata with respect to company size class and no cut-off was made in terms of
minimum size of firms. Strata were to include a share of at least 10% of large
companies (250+ employees) per country-sector cell, 30% of medium sized
enterprises (50-249 employees), 25% of small enterprises (10-49 employees)
and up to 35% of micro enterprises with less than 10 employees. Table
2.5 shows the number of successfully completed interviews in each country-
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sector cell for the survey which was carried out in 2005. Within this survey,
all 10 sectors were covered in each country, which gives a complete and
homogeneous sector-country coverage.
Table 2.6: Country-sector coverage e-Business W@tch survey 2006
The e-Business Watch survey 2006 was the fourth survey after those of
2002, 2003 and 2005 and had a scope of 14,081 interviews with decision-
makers in enterprises from 29 countries, including the 25 EU Member States,
EEA and Candidate Countries. The design of the questionnaire builds on the
ones used in the previous surveys from 2002 to 2005. As in 2005, the survey
considered only companies that used computers. Thus, the highest level of
the population was the set of all computer-using enterprises which were active
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within the national territory of one of the 29 countries covered, and which
had their primary business activity in one of the 10 sectors specified on the
basis of NACE Rev. 1.1.
No cut-off was made in terms of minimum size of firms. The sample drawn
was a random sample of companies from the respective sector population in
each of the seven countries, with the objective of fulfilling minimum strata
with respect to company size class per country-sector cell. Strata were to
include a 10% share of large companies (250+ employees), 30% of medium
sized enterprises (50-249 employees), 25% of small enterprises (10-49 employ-
ees) and up to 35% of micro enterprises with less than 10 employees. Samples
were drawn based on widely recognized business directories and databases.
In most countries, between 400 and 750 interviews were conducted. Table 2.6
shows the number of successfully completed interviews in each country-sector
cell for the e-Business Watch survey which was carried out in 2006.
2.6.2 Variables description and descriptive statistics
Table 2.7: Variable definitions
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Table 2.8: Descriptive statistics
Table 2.9: Correlation matrix
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Chapter 3
Value chain structure and
flexible production technologies
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I analyze the interplay between the value chain organiza-
tion, the adoption of flexible production technologies (FPT) leading to more
product variety and welfare implications of such actions. Choosing FPT over
dedicated production technology (DPT) allows a manufacturer to gain ac-
cess to inputs necessary to extend its product variety. In order to link the
characteristics of FPT with the firm scope and supplier relations, I develop a
theoretical model that allows for an analysis of suppliers’ incentives to merge
and manufacturers’ decisions regarding the choice of production technolo-
gies that are specific to inputs produced by suppliers. Two questions are
of major importance here: First, how does the structure of the upstream
industry, market size and the degree of product differentiation affect pro-
ducers’ incentives to adopt FPT? Second, what are the welfare implications
of the decisions regarding investments in the production technologies under
different structures of the upstream industry?
The motivation for this analysis is the technological shock that, over the
last two decades, has lead to a reorganization of value chain structure and
that moves industries away from mass production to mass customization.
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Flexible machines and multitasking production equipment replace specialized
and single-purpose equipment. Because FPT can be reprogrammed quickly,
they can be seen as an ability to produce several products in a single plant
or on a single assembly line at a low cost, relatively to the specialized equip-
ment designed for mass production of homogeneous products (Milgrom and
Roberts (1990)). Consequently, modern manufacturing is being transformed
by the adoption of FPT and complementary changes in firms’ strategy and
organization. In particular, FPT enable firms to change their strategies and
the way they organize their activities within and between organizations. New
strategies include broadening product lines, frequent product introductions
and improvements. Such behavior is consistent with the argument that, as
firms seek to escape competition, implementing technologies that allow for
extending product line and increasing product variety is a major point of
emphasis in the quest for additional profits (Lancaster (1990)). Regarding
organizational changes, a firm’s processes, internal structure, and the rela-
tionships with outside partners are strongly influenced by its product strat-
egy and technology in place (Brynjolfsson et al. (2002)). Consequently, value
chain characteristics and production technology have a considerable impact
on the competition in the input and product markets and, eventually, on
welfare.
To model the interplay between value chain organization, technology and
increasing product variety, regarding the technology characteristics, I follow
the assumptions made by Röller and Tombak (1990). In a linear framework,
they model FPT as a technology that enables firms to produce parallel two
products instead of only one. According to their results, investing in FPT
leads to more competition and subsequently reduces prices and profits of
both firms. Their conclusion is that flexibility is detrimental to firms’ profits
and companies are better-off when they remain one-product monopolists.
Furthermore, although more flexibility leads to the transfer of surplus from
producers to consumers, parallel production of both goods is desirable from
the social point of view only when products are enough differentiated (Gupta
(1998)).
An alternative treatment of flexible production technologies can be found
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in Eaton and Schmitt (1994). They use a Hotelling model in which they
describe the effects of new production system on firms’ ability to lower the
cost of product customization and the cost of switching the production pro-
cess from one variant to another. The focus of their analysis is, however,
different from the one of the current work. In their work, they study the
implications of flexible manufacturing systems for market structure and find
that they promote concentration through preemption and mergers. By using
a similar approach, Norman and Thisse (1999) arrive to a conclusion that the
monopoly preemption is still feasible, but it will lead to excessive product
variety.
Concerning the value chain dimension, I follow Horn and Wolinsky (1988)
who model a duopoly in which producers buy inputs through bilateral mono-
poly relations with suppliers. This setting reflects the vertical relations mod-
elled in this analysis in a state when both downstream firms use dedicated
technologies. Analyzing horizontal mergers, they find that the distribution of
bargaining power might have important implications for merger incentives.
For example, in contrast to the finding of this analysis, they argue that under
some conditions duopoly structure might be profit maximizing for the up-
stream industry. Following this line of analysis, Milliou and Petrakis (2005)
modify the bargaining setting and find that under some conditions suppliers
prefer to act independently as well.
To my best knowledge, the problem of flexible production technologies in
the context of vertical relations has been not analyzed yet. Available liter-
ature on vertical relations and technology focuses on supplier-buyer specific
investments and the impact of vertical merger on such investments. This
approach assumes that technology used by vertically separated firms influ-
ences input price, not product variety. For example, Kranton and Minehart
(2004) use a framework in which there are two upstream and two downstream
firms. Downstream firms compete for one indivisible input unit produced by
each supplier. Buyers’ valuation of input depends on their investments into
supplier-specific assets. Focusing on vertical merger and its effect on down-
stream investment decisions into assets that are specific to supplier-buyer
relations, they find that vertical merger might distort investments into tech-
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nologies reducing production costs of the remaining firms. Similarly, regard-
ing efficiency-increasing investments, Inderst and Wey (2003) analyze the
effect of upstream and downstream market structure on suppliers’ innova-
tion investments. They consider technological flexibility in terms of produc-
tion volume and technology choice that determines the level of production
costs. Another work by Inderst and Wey (2007) follows this line and ana-
lyzes the question of how the distribution of bargaining power in value chain
affects suppliers’ incentives to make technological improvements and reduce
marginal production costs.
The model developed in this chapter exhibits characteristics of successive
monopolies and foreclosure. Regarding the issue of successive monopolies,
due to the type of relations between upstream and downstream firms, we can
observe a well-known problem of double marginalization (Spengler (1950)).
Although designing a remedy to this problem is beyond the scope of this
chapter, it is worthwhile to mention that the use of flexible production tech-
nologies intensifies competition in the input and consumer market and re-
duces the harmful effect of double marginalization. Regarding the foreclosure
concept, provided that there are cost or technological barriers to procure in-
puts necessary to broaden a firm’s product line, flexible technologies can be
seen as a device to bypass foreclosure. Consequently, this links the current
analysis to the discussion of vertical foreclosure and incentives to invest (see,
for example, Hart et al. (1990), Baake et al. (2003), Fumagalli et al. (2006)
and Rey and Tirole (2007).
The current model includes some elements of exclusive dealing and verti-
cal integration as well. These issues are analyzed, for example, by Bonanno
and Vickers (1988). By using a two-part tariff contract as a mechanism to
set prices, they model two single-product manufacturers that sell their prod-
ucts to independent retailers and analyze what are producers’ incentives to
vertically integrate or to sell their products through independent retailers.
Similar approach can be found, for example, in Rey and Tirole (1986) and
Rey and Stiglitz (1988).
Other papers that are closely related to the current one include Lin (1990)
and Ziss (1995). The former one models two retail chains and argues that
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upstream firms choose an exclusive dealing set-up in order to relax intra-
brand competition. In the context of the current model, flexible technologies
might have pro-competitive effects, as they remove the exclusive dealing con-
straints, intensify inter-brand rivalry and introduce intra-brand competition.
Ziss (1995) explicitly includes the issue of vertical mergers at both levels. His
main finding is that both types of merger have anti-competitive effects.
Despite drawing on some already analyzed concepts, the design of the
current analysis differs from previous contributions. First, using the frame-
work of complementarity between technology, strategy and organization, I
formalize the idea of the adoption of flexible vs. specialized production equip-
ment and link it to firms’ strategies regarding broadening product line and
their impact on competition at the upstream and downstream level. Second,
I discuss the concept of technology as a means to bypass foreclosure and
its pro-competitive effects. This casts some new light on how technological
progress removes barriers to competition and, consequently, influences social
welfare. Lastly, I analyze welfare implications of different technology states
under both competitive and monopolistic structure of the upstream industry.
Besides confirming existing findings, the contributions of the analysis are
many fold. First, running counter to intuition, the results reveal that in-
creased competition due to the diffusion of FPT might erode any benefits
of such technologies. Although the use of FPT might be profitable from a
point of view of an individual firm, when all firms in the industry adopt such
technologies they collectively forsake profits. Consequently, as there is a co-
ordination problem, firms end up in a Prisoners’ Dilemma situation. To a
large extent, this confirms the results of Röller and Tombak (1990). Consid-
ering the effect of the structure of the upstream industry, I show that under
some conditions, i.e. when products are complements, manufacturers are
more likely to adopt FPT when there is a multi-product monopolistic sup-
plier of both inputs, as compared to a state with two independent suppliers.
The reverse is true when products are substitutes. Second, I show that the
introduction of FPT by downstream producers has two effects on the payoff
to the upstream industry. On the one hand, selling to both firms increases
intra-brand competition and reduces suppliers’ profits. On the other hand,
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suppliers benefit from the pro-competitive effects of FPT on the final mar-
ket. It seems that the latter effect dominates the former one. Furthermore,
regarding suppliers, unlike in Lin (1990), under the current setting suppliers
prefer to supply both downstream firms to exclusive interaction with only
one of them. Third, the adoption of FPT is always beneficial from the con-
sumers and suppliers point of view. The fact that new technologies have
always positive effect on consumer surplus is different from the findings of
Röller and Tombak (1990) who concluded that such investments by down-
stream firms generate benefits to consumers only for sufficiently differentiated
products. Furthermore, considering the structure of the upstream industry,
I find that a supplier merger increases consumer surplus when products are
complements. In total, the diffusion of FPT has a positive impact on to-
tal welfare, provided that products are not close substitutes, and for some
intermediate values of market size, companies’ equilibrium decisions lead to
socially inefficient outcomes.
Empirical research confirms that information and communication tech-
nologies (ICT) enable firms to expand product variety and to deal with a
following raise in the complexity and sophistication of technological and
business processes (e.g. Bakos, et al. (1986), Jaikumar, (1986), Holland
et al. (1997)). For example, a combination of new computer-based flexible
machinery with new work practices allowed a Johnson&Johnson factory to
significantly increase the variety of products it could manufacture and reduce
costs (Brynjolfsson et al. (2002)). Similar trends can be observed in the elec-
tronics industry where the choice of products and their functionalities have
been dramatically increasing over the last decades (Petkova (2003)). Dell
Computer is a quintessential New Economy company known for its flexibil-
ity, leanness, and a variety of products cut to customers’ needs. Because of
massive investments in ICT, Dell extended the reach and scope of its business
at a relatively low cost (Kraemer, et al. (2001)). Sophisticated technologies
allowed it to automate business and production functions and to coordinate
a network of suppliers and business partners who carry out most of the tasks
involved in developing, building and distributing of personal computers.
The impact of new technologies on product variety is not limited to man-
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ufacturing industries only. Studies of the financial intermediation, airline,
hotel and rental car industries report that systems linking organizations in
value chain, i.e. inter-organizational systems or IOS, allow an agent to access
quickly a wide range of products offered by different providers and to bun-
dle them in order to create a combination cut to individual customer needs
(Hess et al. (1994) or Johnston et al. (1988)). In a study of the causes of
Wal-Mart’s growth, Basker (2007) cites bar code and RFID as major sources
of the retailer’s success. The availability of a technology that reduces the in-
ventory tracking costs and improves the overall efficiency of the supply chain
increases the incentives to add product lines led directly to the creation of
supercenters that sell a full line of groceries in addition to general merchan-
dise. The rapid and ubiquitous spread of ICT and flexible production systems
have implications for suppliers of firms implementing them as well. Dewan
et al. (1998) analyzes the link between the scale and scope of a firm and
its ICT investments with an emphasis on the role of ICT in coordination
with suppliers. The results suggest that ICT investments are positively re-
lated to the degree of firm diversification. Similarly, Hempell et al. (2005)
study how ICT drives product and process innovations by enhancing orga-
nizational flexibility. They conclude that by facilitating communication and
access to information, ICT favours the use of easily programmable machines
and improves the coordination with suppliers. Moreover, ICT increases the
organizational flexibility as it allows for a quick reaction to changes in con-
sumer preferences. This additionally increases the incentives to expand the
product line.
However, the process of strategy and organizational changes driven by
the diffusion of new technologies has consequences that go far beyond the
boundaries of firms that adopt them. For example, as firms broadening
product line remove the boundaries between separate markets, suppliers of
such firms are exposed to stronger competition. Furthermore, an increase
in the number of downstream firms demanding inputs might raise supplier’s
minimum efficient size of operations necessary to satisfy new demand. Thus,
it can be expected that when facing stronger pressure from downstream firms,
suppliers might preempt such challenges. One way to deal with them is
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to increase the scale of operations or to reduce the intensity of upstream
competition. Both effects can be achieved through a consolidation process.
Indeed, it has been observed that firms are going through intensive shake-
outs and waves of mergers during periods of especially high demand (Bernile,
et al. (2007)). Consequently, if profitable at first glance, the adoption of new
production system might not bring the expected payoff once preempted by
other partners in the value chain.
The automotive industry provides an interesting example of the relation-
ship between technology, product variety and vertical organization. The
consolidation within the automotive suppliers’ network is a response to con-
stantly increasing quality demands, taking over more operations in design
and production, on the one hand, and to reduce price, on the other hand.
Consequently, manufacturers are becoming more dependent on suppliers and
suppliers are becoming more involved into development and manufacture of
a greater number of products. As a result, the number of automotive sup-
pliers worldwide is expected to shrink by half by 2015 (VDA (2004)). At
the same time, new technologies deployed in product design, manufacturing
and interactions with suppliers allow car manufacturers to steadily increase
the number of car models (Dicken (2003)). In 2002 there were over 1000 car
models offered for sale in the United States, double as much as in 1980 (van
Biesebroeck (2006)). The answer to the question regarding profitability of
such changes is more complex than it seems. For example, since early ’90s,
the BMW product line has expanded from 5 to 10 lines (PWC, mimeo). At
the same time, the production volume reached over 1.3 million in 2005 from
0.5 million units in 1990. Although, between 2001 and 2005, the revenues
increased by over 30% to nearly 46 billion Euro, gross margin has in fact de-
clined from 8.3% to 6.5% in the same period. Thus, the changes in vertical
structure and the impacts of the diffusion of FPT might go far beyond the
increased product variety offered by firms.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the
model. Section 3.3 analyses outcomes that emerge in the current structure
and Section 3.4 identifies equilibria. Section 3.5 considers welfare implica-
tions of both technology choice and the market structure of the upstream
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industry. Section 3.6 concludes and suggests some potential extensions to
the current analysis. Annex includes proofs.
3.2 The Model
I consider two supply chains in which downstream producers buy inputs from
either one or two suppliers. There are two products in the market, X and Y.
In order to produce each product, downstream firm needs technology that
is specific to the input for a particular product. Figure 3.1 illustrates all
possible technology states. If downstream producer P1 (P2) uses dedicated
technology (D) it can purchase input from upstream supplier U1 (U2) and
supply final good X (Y). This is case (D,D). If downstream firm uses flexible
technology (F) they can be active in both parts of the market (case (F,F)).
Mixed outcomes, i.e. (F,D) and (D,F), in which downstream firms can use
different technologies are allowed. An identical situation is possible when
there is only one supplier of both inputs (dashed circles).
The game has four stages:
• Stage one: Suppliers decide on whether to merge or stay independent.
• Stage two: Producers choose between dedicated and flexible technology.
• Stage three: Suppliers set input prices. I assume that each supplier
maximizes his profit with respect to input price, given demand of down-
stream firms and the strategy of the other supplier. If there is only one
multi-product supplier, he maximizes its profit with respect to both
input prices.
• Stage four: Producers play a Cournot game on the consumer market.
In contrast to Horn and Wolinsky (1988), I assume that suppliers have
all the bargaining power and make take-it-or-leave-it offers to manufacturers.
Within this framework, it is very likely that in equilibrium suppliers choose
to merge over acting independently. The motivation behind this assumption
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Figure 3.1: Technology states
is the question of how technology choices of downstream firms differ with
respect to the market structure of the upstream industry.
In order to describe the market demand for product X and Y, I follow
Matutes et al. (1989) and assume some degree of product differentiation. For
each of the two goods consumers maximize a utility function that is separable
in the numeraire good M :
V [X, Y,M ] = U(X, Y ) +M (3.1)
where X and Y are the total quantities of both products. Let the quadratic
utility function be given by:
U = α(X + Y )− 12(X
2 + Y 2 + 2γXY ), (3.2)
then the first order conditions of the consumer maximization problem yield
the following demand functions:
pX = α− γY −X and pY = α− γX − Y (3.3)
where pX and pY are the prices for product X and Y . X = x1+ x2 and Y =
y1+ y2 are the total quantities of product X and Y produced by downstream
firm i = 1, 2. Parameter γ can be interpreted as a determinant of product
differentiation. Products are complements when −1 ≤ γ < 0 and substitutes
53
when 0 < γ ≤ 1. If γ = 0, product are not related. These conditions
guarantee that the own price effect is always stronger than the cross-price
effect. The vale of α can be interpreted as the potential size of the market.
Regarding the cost structure, I assume that suppliers do not incur any
costs and that the cost of inputs is the only marginal cost of producers.
Thus, given the above defined demand system and cost structure, the payoff
function of each downstream firm i = 1, 2 is:
piPki,j = (pXkj − wXkj )xkij + (pY kj − wY kj )ykij − ft (3.4)
where P denotes downstream firm and k = I,M represents the structure of
the upstream industry where I denotes independent suppliers andM a multi-
product monopolistic supplier. Technology choice of downstream producers
is denoted by j = 1, ..., 4 where j = 1 indicates that both firms invest in
dedicated technologies (D, D), j = 2 when firm 1 invests in technology F and
firm 2 in technology D, (F, D). In this case, firm 2 procures input only from
supplier 2 and firm 1 from both of them. The reverse is true in j = 3 when
firm 2 chooses technology F and firm 1 technology D, (D,F). The last case,
j = 4, is when both firms invest in technology F, (F, F). This means that
both downstream firms can procure inputs for both products. Input prices
for product X and Y are given by wXk and wY k respectively. ft is the fixed
cost of the production technology t = D,F that downstream firms need to
incur. Let the cost of dedicated technology be fD = 1 and the cost of flexible
technology fF = 1 + s. To make it realistic, I assume that technology F
is more costly than technology D, i.e. s > 0. Both production technologies
exhibit constant returns to scale, i.e. out of one unit of input downstream firm
produces one unit of output. As tie-breaking rules, if downstream producer
is indifferent between technologies it will choose flexible one.
The payoff function of independent upstream firms i = 1, 2 is given by:
piU1,j = wXkj Xkj and piU2j = wY kj Y kj (3.5)
where U denotes upstream firm. Supplier 1 produces input for final product
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X and supplier 2 for final product Y. A single supplier faces the following
maximization problem
piUM,j = wXkj Xkj + wY kj Y kj (3.6)
where M denotes a multiproduct monopolistic supplier. Whenever suppliers
are indifferent between merging or remaining independent they will merge.
Table 3.1 exhibits the payoffs to downstream and upstream firms in all pos-
sible settings.
Table 3.1: Technology choice and firms’ payoffs
Firm 2
D F
Firm 1 D (piPk11 , piPk21 ), (piU11, piU21) or piUM1 (piPk13 , piPk23 ), (piU13, piU23) or piUM1
F (piPk12 , piPk22 ), (piU12, piU22) or piUM1 (piPk14 , piPk24 ), (piU14, piU24) or piUM1
3.3 Input prices and product quantities
Except for the whole game, there are two sub-games. One with indepen-
dent suppliers of each intermediary product and one with a multi-product
upstream monopoly. Depending on the technology choice, there are four pos-
sible outcomes at the downstream level. By using backward induction, in the
following section I solve the game for the final quantities and input prices
that arise in each technology state under both structures of the upstream
industry. Then, I use these results to find a sub-game perfect equilibrium of
the merger and technology game.
3.3.1 Independent suppliers
Technology outcome (D,D): In the first case, (D, D), both manufactur-
ers use dedicated technologies and supply only one product. Firm 1 produces
good X and firm 2 produces good Y. In this case, firm 1 interacts with sup-
plier 1 and firm 2 with supplier 2. Both downstream firms have symmetric
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profit functions of the form:
piPI11 = (pXI1 − wXI1 )xI11 − 1 and piPI21 = (pY I1 − wY I1 )yI21 − 1. (3.7)
Solving for Cournot equilibrium outcomes, yields symmetric quantities:
xI∗11 =
α(γ − 2)− γwY I1 + 2wXI1
γ2 − 4 and y
I∗
21 =
α(γ − 2)− γwXI1 + 2wY I1
γ2 − 4 . (3.8)
As one piece of input is used up to produce one piece of output, quantities
produced by manufacturers are at the same time the demanded quantities
for inputs. Thus, by maximizing their profit functions with respect to wXI1
and wY I1 , suppliers set symmetric prices for product X and Y:
wXI∗1 = wY I∗1 =
α(γ − 2)
γ − 4 . (3.9)
Substituting input prices into the reaction functions of downstream firms
leads to the following expression:
xI∗11 = yI∗21 =
2α
(γ + 2)(4− γ) . (3.10)
In other words, both firms produce identical quantities of the final products.
Technology outcome (F,D) or (D,F): In the second and third case,
asymmetric outcomes arise, i.e. when one downstream firm uses dedicated
and the other one flexible technology. Let us consider the (F,D) outcome
when firm 1 uses technology F and firm 2 technology D. In this case, manu-
facturer 1 is able to interact with supplier 1 and 2. As a result, it produces
X and Y. Manufacturer 2, in contrast, procures only from supplier 2 and
produces product Y only. Thus, the payoff functions of manufacturers are
asymmetric, i.e.
piPI12 = (pXI2 − wXI2 )xI12 + (pY I2 − wY I2 )yI12 − (1 + s) (3.11)
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and piPI22 = (pY I2 − wY I2 )yI22 − 1. (3.12)
By maximizing the above expression with respect to xI12, yI12 and yI22, one
obtains the following reaction functions:
xI∗12 =
α(γ − 1)− γwY I2 + wXI2
2(γ2 − 1) (3.13)
and yI∗12 =
α(γ2 − 3γ + 2)− γ2wY I2 + 3γwXI2 − 2wY I2
6(1− γ2) , y
I∗
22 =
α− wY I2
3 .
(3.14)
The above quantities enter the profit functions of upstream firms, which
maximize them with respect to input prices wXI2 and wY I2 . As a result,
asymmetric prices for X and Y arise:
wXI∗2 =
α(γ3 − 5γ2 − 4γ + 8)
16− 7γ2 and w
Y I∗
2 =
α(5γ2 + 3γ − 8)
7γ2 − 16 . (3.15)
By substituting input prices into the reaction functions of downstream firms,
one obtains the following equilibrium quantities:
xI∗12 =
α(γ2 − 4γ − 8)
2(γ + 1)(7γ2 − 16) , (3.16)
and yI∗12 =
α(γ3 + 10γ2 + 2γ − 16)
6(γ + 1)(7γ2 − 16) , y
I∗
22 =
α(2γ2 − 3γ − 8)
3(7γ2 − 16) . (3.17)
It is straightforward, that the demand for input Y is higher than for input
X. Consequently, supplier 2 earns a higher profit because it sells inputs to
both downstream firms.
In the third case, (D, F), the reverse of the (F,D) state is true. That
is, piPI13 = piPI22 and piPI23 = piPI12 at the downstream level, and piU13 = piU22 and
piU23 = piU12 at the upstream level.
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Technology outcome (F,F): In the fourth technology case, (F, F), both
manufacturers invest in F technology and each of them procures both inputs
and produces X and Y. Consequently, manufacturers maximize symmetric
profit functions with respect to xIi4 and yIi4:
piPI14 = (pXI4 − wXI4 )xI14 + (pY I4 − wY I4 )yI14 − (1 + s) (3.18)
and piPI24 = (pXI4 − wXI4 )xI24 + (pY I4 − wY I4 )yI24 − (1 + s). (3.19)
This gives symmetric quantities of xIi4 and yIi4 manufactured by downstream
firms, i.e.:
xI∗14 = xI∗24 =
α(γ − 1)− γwY I4 + wXI4
3(γ2 − 1) (3.20)
and yI∗14 = yI∗24 =
α(γ − 1)− γwXI4 + wY I4
3(γ2 − 1) . (3.21)
In contrast to the (D,D) outcome, suppliers deliver their inputs to both
downstream firms and their profit functions can be expressed as
piU14 = wXI4 (xI14 + xI24) (3.22)
and piU24 = wY4 (yI14 + yI24). (3.23)
Again, this leads to symmetric input prices for X and Y:
wXI∗4 = wY I∗4 =
α(γ − 1)
γ − 2 (3.24)
and eventually symmetric quantities sold on the final market are:
xI∗14 = xI∗24 = yI∗14 = yI∗24 =
α
3(2− γ)(γ + 1) . (3.25)
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3.3.2 A monopolistic multiproduct supplier
Technology outcome (D,D): As in the case with independent suppliers,
downstream firms have symmetric profit functions (3.7) and, consequently,
symmetric reaction functions (3.8). A multiproduct single supplier sets both
input prices at the highest possible level, i.e. wXM1 = wYM1 = α2 . The resulting
equilibrium quantities are
xM∗11 = yM∗21 =
2α
2(γ + 2) . (3.26)
Technology outcome (F,D) or (D,F): Again, in the asymmetric case, a
monopolistic supplier takes the demand of manufacturers given by (3.13) and
(3.14) and maximizes its profit by setting monopolistic prices for both inputs.
Thus, substituting input prices into the reaction functions of downstream
firms leads to the following expression:
xM∗12 =
α
4(γ + 1) , (3.27)
and yM∗12 =
α(2− γ)
12(γ + 1) , y
M∗
22 =
α
6 . (3.28)
In the (D, F) case, the reverse of the second state is true, i.e. xM∗13 =
yM∗22 , x
M∗
23 = yM∗12 , yM∗23 = xM∗12 , piPM13 = piPM22 and piPM23 = piPM12 at the down-
stream level, and piUM3 = piUM2 at the upstream level.
Technology outcome (F,F): Similarly as above, the monopolistic sup-
plier maximizes its total profit by setting monopolistic input prices for both
products. The final outcome of the Cournot competition by downstream
firms can be expressed as
xM∗14 = xM∗24 = yM∗14 = yM∗24 =
α
6(γ + 1) . (3.29)
Table 3.4 and 3.5 (annex) present equilibrium expressions for all possible
technology states when suppliers stay independent or when they merge.
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3.4 Equilibrium analysis
By comparing equilibrium profits in each market structure and technology
outcome, I look for a sub-game perfect equilibrium. In addition, this section
discusses the impact of technology cost, market size and the degree of product
differentiation on the choice of upstream market structure and the adoption
of production technology.
3.4.1 Independent suppliers
This section deals with the sub-game with a competitive structure of the up-
stream industry. After suppliers chose to stay independent in the first stage,
producers choose between FPT and DPT in the second stage. Subsequently,
each supplier maximizes its profit with respect to input price, given quanti-
ties ordered by downstream firms and the strategy of the other supplier. In
the last stage, downstream producers compete in a Cournot game.
Independent suppliers and (D, D) equilibrium: The state with two
independent suppliers and downstream firms choosing dedicated technologies
is an equilibrium when two conditions are satisfied. First, from table 3.1 we
see that both downstream firms choose D technology when
piPI12 − piPI11 < 0 and piPI23 − piPI21 < 0. (3.30)
This can be expressed as:
f IDD(γ)−
s
α2
< 0 (3.31)
where
f IDD(γ) =
(γ7 + 3γ6 − 68γ5 + 8γ4 − 176γ3 − 832γ2 − 1152γ − 1024)
36(γ + 1)(γ − 4)2(γ + 2)2(7γ2 − 16) (3.32)
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Second, for the equilibrium to exist, profits of independent suppliers must be
higher than this of a monopolistic supplier. This is true when
piU11 + piU21 > piUM1. (3.33)
This condition is satisfied if
a2γ2
2(γ + 2)(γ − 4)2 < 0. (3.34)
Regarding the choice of technology, expression (3.31) suggests that both buy-
ers remain using D technologies when α is small and s is high. In other words,
small market size discourages firms from entering the part of the market dom-
inated by the other firm. Each firm prefers to stay a one-product monopolist
rather than to get involved into direct competition with the other firm. Large
values of s additionally discourage firms investments into flexible production
systems.
Turning to the second condition (3.34), it is known from Salant (1983)
that merger to monopoly is always profitable. This result holds when all the
firms collude, so that there are no outsiders. In this case, there are only two
firms and it can be seen that whenever products X and Y are complements
or substitutes, i.e. γ ∈ [−1, 1], (3.34) is always positive and suppliers choose
to merge.
Independent suppliers and (F, F) equilibrium: The state with two
independent suppliers and both downstream firms choosing flexible technol-
ogy is an equilibrium when two conditions are satisfied. First, from table 3.1
we see that both downstream firms choose F technology when
piPI14 ≥ piPI12 and piPI24 ≥ piPI23 . (3.35)
This condition is satisfied if
f IFF (γ)−
s
α2
≥ 0 (3.36)
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where
f IFF (γ) =
(256− 192γ − 164γ2 + 128γ3 − 35γ4 − 13γ5 + 24γ6 − 4γ7)
9(γ + 1)(γ − 2)2(7γ2 − 16)2 .
(3.37)
Second, profits of independent suppliers must be higher than a monopolist’s
payoff. This is true when
piU14 + piU24 > piUM4 (3.38)
which can be expressed as:
α2γ2
3(γ − 2)2(γ + 1) < 0. (3.39)
In line with the above case, both producers will switch to technology F when
α is large. In other words, large market size gives firms a strong incentive to
produce both products and to get involved into direct competition with the
other firm. The revenue generated from the sales of the additional product
compensate the losses from more intense competition and lower prices. Of
course, high technology cots reduces the gains from an increased product
variety.
Regarding the upstream market structure, as in the previous case condi-
tion (3.39) is fulfilled for all values of γ. Thus, suppliers always choose to
merge, given that they are price setters in the input market.
Independent suppliers and mixed equilibria: In (F, D) or (D, F)
equilibrium, producer 1 uses technology F and producer 2 technology D or
the other way around. Such mixed equilibria exist when two conditions are
satisfied. First, from table 3.1 we know that (F, D) or (D, F) is an equilibrium
when
piPI12 − piPI11 ≥ 0 and piPI24 − piPI22 < 0 (3.40)
and
piPI14 − piPI13 < 0 and piPI23 − piPI21 ≥ 0. (3.41)
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This can be expressed as:
f IDD(γ)−
s
α2
≥ 0 (3.42)
and
f IFF (γ)−
s
α2
< 0. (3.43)
Second, profits of independent suppliers must be higher than this of a mo-
nopolistic supplier. This is true when
piU12 + piU22 > piUM2 and piU13 + piU23 > piUM3. (3.44)
This condition is satisfied if
α2γ2(112 + 112γ + 5γ2 − 13γ3)
8(γ + 1)(7γ2 − 16)2 < 0. (3.45)
Regarding the technology choice of downstream companies, these sub-
game equilibria would result in the region between condition (3.31) and
(3.36). However, because the pay-off to the multi-product monopolistic sup-
plier is always higher than to the independent suppliers and upstream firms
choose to merge. Consequently, expression (3.45) is positive for all values
of α and γ and there is no equilibrium with a competitive structure of the
upstream industry. In conclusion, the analysis of the above equilibrium con-
ditions can be summarized in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1: For all values of α, γ and s, suppliers choose to merge
and there is no equilibrium with a competitive upstream market
structure.
Proof: The proof emerges from the suppliers’ profit conditions, i.e. con-
dition (3.34), (3.39) and (3.45) are never satisfied. In other words, the profit
of a multiproduct monopolistic supplier is never smaller than the cumula-
tive profit of independent suppliers. The same result can be found in Salant
(1983). Consequently, there is no outcome with a competitive upstream
market structure in the equilibrium.
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3.4.2 A single supplier
This section analyses candidate equilibria that emerge given the upstream
industry was monopolized in the first stage of the game. Proceeding as
above, the game is solved by backward induction. After suppliers decided to
merge in the first stage, downstream firms choose production technology in
the second stage. Subsequently, a monopolist supplier maximizes its profit
function with respect to input prices given quantities ordered by downstream
firms. In the last stage manufacturers set the quantities of the final goods in
a Cournot game.
A single supplier and (D, D) equilibrium The state with one sup-
plier and downstream firms choosing dedicated technology is an equilibrium
when two conditions are satisfied. First, both downstream firms choose D
technology when the following condition holds:
fMDD(γ)−
s
α2
< 0 (3.46)
where
fMDD(γ) =
(16− 4γ − 7γ2 − 5γ3)
144(γ + 1)(γ + 2)2 . (3.47)
Second, suppliers merge if the monopolistic profit is higher than the profits
of the two sellers. This condition is fulfilled if
α2γ2
2(γ + 2)(γ − 4)2 ≥ 0. (3.48)
From the above analysis we know that condition (3.46) depends on the de-
gree of product differentiation, market size and the cost of F technology.
The smaller the market and the higher the cost of F technology relatively to
D technology, the more are downstream firms inclined to stay with D tech-
nology. Regarding the upstream firms, profit of a single supplier is always
higher than the profits of separate firms and, consequently, suppliers choose
to merge.
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A single supplier and (F, F) equilibrium The state with one supplier
and both downstream firms choosing F technology is an equilibrium when
two conditions are satisfied. First, downstream firms choose F technology
when
fMFF (γ)−
s
α2
≥ 0 (3.49)
where
fMFF (γ) =
(1− γ)
36(γ + 1) . (3.50)
Second, profit of a monopolistic supplier is higher than profits of independent
suppliers when
α2γ2
3(γ − 2)2(γ + 1) ≥ 0. (3.51)
Considering condition (3.49), the choice of F technology is again dependent
on the market size, the degree of product differentiation, and the cost of
flexible technology. However, although a larger market size encourages both
firm to switch to flexible technology and to produce both products, the in-
centive to expand is reduced by the cost of the new technology. The effect
of γ is equally important for the technology choice. It is easy to see that
the expansion strongly depends on the degree of product differentiation. Re-
garding the merger incentive, we know that (3.51) is positive for all values
of γ. Thus, suppliers always choose to merge.
A single supplier and mixed equilibria: The state with one supplier
and downstream firms choosing different technologies is an equilibrium when
two conditions are satisfied. First, from table 3.1 we see that (F, D) or (D,
F) are selected when
fMDD(γ)−
s
α2
≥ 0 (3.52)
and
fMFF (γ)−
s
α2
< 0. (3.53)
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Second, the profit of a monopolistic supplier is higher than the profits of
independent suppliers when
α2γ2(112 + 112γ + 5γ2 − 13γ3)
8(γ + 1)(7γ2 − 16)2 ≥ 0. (3.54)
Considering that (3.54) is positive for all γ and, consequently, that suppliers
always merge, mixed equilibria would result in the region between condition
(3.53) and (3.54). Both conditions are satisfied when firms sell complemen-
tary products. Thus, unlike in Röller and Tombak (1990), for some values of
α and γ, mixed equilibria can emerge (see also Kim et al. (1992) and Gupta
(1993)).
The analysis of the above equilibrium conditions can be summarized in
the following lemma:
Lemma 2: Suppliers always choose to merge. The technology
choice of downstream firms depends on α, γ and s.
Proof: In the previous sub-section, I proved that conditions (3.34), (3.39)
and (3.45) are never satisfied and, therefore, suppliers always prefer to merge
to act independently. Regarding the choice of technology by downstream
firms, it can be seen from condition (3.46) and (3.49) that the incentives to
choose particular technology vary with α, γ and s. Concluding, Lemma 1
and Lemma 2 can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In equilibrium, suppliers choose to merge. The
technology choice of downstream firms depends on the size of the
market, the degree of product differentiation and the technology
cost in the following way:
• (D,D) is an equilibrium if α < √ s
fMDD(γ)
,
• (F,F) is an equilibrium if α ≥ √ s
fMFF (γ)
,
• and (F,D) or (D,F) arise in equilibrium when √ s
fMDD(γ)
≤
α <
√
s
fMFF (γ)
.
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium regions given independent (i) and monopolistic (m)
supplier (s=0.5)
Figure 3.2 illustrates equilibrium regions for all technology choices in
α and γ for a value of s = 0.5. To check the robustness of the results, the
figure was plotted for various parameters of s. The results are not sensitive
to the changes of parameter values. For illustrative purposes, I include equi-
librium outcomes that would emerge under the competitive structure of the
upstream industry. Let us consider first the sub-game with two independent
suppliers. The region below the (D,D)i curve includes the technology state in
which both downstream firms remain with dedicated technology. The surface
above the (F,F)i curve shows the technology state in which both firms switch
to flexible technology. The area between (D,D)i and (F,F)i includes mixed
technology choices. It can be seen that, if there were two suppliers, all pos-
sible combinations of technology usage patterns could emerge. For example,
when products X and Y are complements mixed outcomes would exist for
γ ∈ [−1,−0.41]. That is, one firm would invest into FPT whereas the other
one would remain with specialized equipment. Similarly, mixed outcomes
could emerge for substitutable products. Then, both companies would in-
vest into flexible production technologies only when market was sufficiently
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large. Otherwise either one or both firms would remain with specialized
equipment. For γ ∈ [−0.41, 0] both equilibria could exist, i.e. (D,D) and
(F,F).
Investment decisions look slightly different when there is a multi-product
monopolistic supplier. Similar as above, the region below the (D,D)m curve
includes the technology state in which both downstream firms remain with
dedicated technology. The surface above the (F,F)m curve shows the tech-
nology state in which both firms use flexible technology. The area between
(D,D)m and (F,F)m includes mixed technology outcomes. Again, we can ob-
serve that all technology choices can emerge in equilibrium. For example,
mixed equilibria exist only when products are complements. For substi-
tutable products only (F,F) or (D,D) emerge in equilibrium. Furthermore,
for γ ∈ [0, 1] two equilibria exist and companies face a coordination problem
for some values of α.
As it emerges from the above analysis, it is quite striking how the degree of
product differentiation influences the decision to adopt flexible technologies
under different structures of the upstream industry. Compared to a situa-
tion when there are two independent suppliers, when manufacturers produce
complementary products they are more likely to adopt F technology in small
markets under monopolistic upstream market structure. This is, however,
reversed when products are substitutes. Then FPT would be adopted in
much smaller markets if supplier acted independently.
In conclusion, taking into account all possible outcomes, in equilibrium
there is a monopolistic supplier of both products. The final outcome regard-
ing the choice of production is less obvious and depends on the values of γ, α
and s, i.e. it is a function of market size, the degree of product differentiation
and the cost difference between dedicated and flexible production technology.
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3.5 Welfare implications
3.5.1 Consumer surplus
Considering that there are linear demand functions for product X and Y, con-
sumer surplus is given by the difference between consumers’ utility and the
total expenses for purchased goods. Thus, the combined consumer surplus
for a given technology state j is given by:
CSkj =
1
2((X
k
j )2 + (Y kj )2) + γXkj Y kj (3.55)
where Xkj and Y kj are the equilibrium total quantities of product X and Y un-
der upstream market structure k = I,M and technology state j. Equilibrium
values of consumer surplus are given in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Consumer surplus
Independent suppliers
(D,D) 4α(γ+1)(γ−4)2(γ+2)2
Mixed equilibrium α2(55γ5−47γ4−632γ3−176γ2+1792γ+1600)72(γ+1)(7γ2−16)2
(F,F) 4α29(γ+1)(γ−2)2
A single supplier
(D,D) α2(γ+1)4(γ+2)2
Mixed equilibrium α2(7γ+25)288(γ+1)
(F,F) α29(γ+1)
An analysis of the consumer surplus equilibrium values leads to the fol-
lowing lemma:
Lemma 3: If CSkj is the total consumer surplus in technology
state j under upstream market structure k, then:
a) CSI4 ≥ CSI2 = CSI3 ≥ CSI1 ;
b) CSM4 ≥ CSM2 = CSM3 ≥ CSM1 ;
c) CSI4 ≥ CSM4 if γ ∈ [0, 1];
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d) CSI4 ≤ CSM4 if γ ∈ [−1, 0].
Proof. See annex.
Results (a) and (b) imply that consumer surplus is always maximized
when downstream firms extend their product range. In other words, con-
sumers benefit from an increased competition that results from firms’ de-
cisions to serve both parts of the market. If there were two independent
input suppliers, the introduction of flexible production systems would intro-
duce intra-brand competition and intensify inter-brand rivalry as well. When
the upstream industry is monopolized the main trigger of consumer welfare
increase is the intensified competition in the final product market. Conse-
quently, the structure of the upstream industry does not have any effect on
consumer surplus when only the technology states are considered. It should
be noted that this is true for all types of products.
Although intuitively straightforward, this finding is slightly different from
the result in Röller et al. (1990), Gupta (1993) and Gupta (1993). They
show that consumer surplus is maximized in (F,F) technology state only for
0 < γ ≤ 0.80. In other words, the use of FPT decreases consumer surplus
when product X and Y are close substitutes. Under the current setting,
however, consumer surplus is the highest when both producers use FPT over
the entire range of γ. Consequently, I show that it is always desirable to
adopt FPT from the consumers’ point of view. This is due to the fact that
this type of technologies enable firms to cross the boundaries of the originally
separated parts of the market, which in turn leads to more competition among
firm that were previously isolated from each other and thereby lower prices.
This result holds even when the upstream industry is monopolized.
This finding is different from the conclusion made by Norman and Thisse
(1999) as well. According to them, consumers might not benefit from tougher
competition. Within the current setting, however, one can conclude that
consumers always get the benefit of an increased competition between man-
ufacturers. The source of this discrepancy is the difference in model setting
and in the scope of analysis. In particular, they analyze the impact of the
introduction of flexible technologies on entry, an issue not covered here, and
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find that this type of manufacturing deters entry. This, in turn, reduces the
pro-competitive effect of flexibility.
In conclusion, the results regarding the use of technology can be summa-
rized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2: The use of FPT always maximizes consumer
surplus.
Proof: The proof of this proposition follows directly from the results de-
scribed above and summarized in Lemma 3.
Considering the effect of the upstream industry structure on consumer
surplus, the above discussion suggests that consumer surplus should be max-
imized under competitive conditions. However, this depends on the type of
products. Results (c) and (d) imply that, on the one hand, when products are
substitutes, a competitive market structure of the input market would lead to
the maximization of the consumer surplus. On the other hand, however, when
products are complements consumer surplus is maximized when there is a
single supplier of both inputs. This indicates that upstream merger might be
desirable from the consumers’ point of view when products are complements.
The source of this positive effect of the monopolization of the input industry
is that, when products are complements, monopolistic input price is always
lower than the price set by independent suppliers. To see this, one needs
to consider the difference between input prices under both upstream market
structures. For the (D,D) technology state and for the (F,F) technology state
the following conditions are always fulfilled for complementary products:
wXI∗1 − α2 ≥ 0⇔ αγ2(γ−4) ≥ 0 and wXI∗4 − α2 ≥ 0⇔ αγ2(γ−2) ≥ 0. In a mixed case,
this effect exists only for the input for which there is a demand from two sup-
pliers, i.e. in the (F,D) technology state wXI∗2 − α2 ≤ 0⇔ α(32+8γ+3γ
2−2γ3
2(7γ2−16) ≤ 0
and, as above, wY I∗2 − α2 ≥ 0⇔ 3αγ(2+γ)2(7γ2−16) ≥ 0.
3.5.2 Producer surplus
Although it might be intuitively justified for downstream firms to extend
their product range, the profitability of such a move needs to be verified
71
in light of adverse impacts they might have on the competition in the final
product market and in the input market. Thus, the following section analyses
the payoffs to the upstream and downstream industries in different equilibria
and, in addition, compares them with the outcomes under a competitive
structure of the upstream industry. I first look at the payoffs of upstream
firms and then turn to the surplus of downstream companies. The total
profits of the upstream and downstream industry are presented in annex (see
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5).
Upstream firms
The introduction of FPT by downstream firms should increase the demand
for intermediary products. However, when downstream firm switches from
a dedicated to a flexible technology it begins to procure both inputs and,
as a result, imposes some externality on its original supplier. The type of
this externality depends on the degree of product differentiation. For ex-
ample, let us consider a situation in which only producer 1 adopts flexible
technology and producer 2 remains with dedicated production system. On
the one hand, when products are complements higher demand for input Y
should increase the demand for input X. Thus, the decision of producer 1 to
enter the other part of the market creates positive externality for supplier 1.
On the other hand, however, when products are substitutes, the demand for
input Y increases at the expense of input X. This, in turn, imposes negative
externality on supplier 1 which increases in γ. To see this, it is enough to
show that
USI4 − USI2 ≥ 0 and USI4 − USI3 ≥ 0 (3.56)
and
USI4 − USI1 ≥ 0 (3.57)
where USkj represents total payoffs of suppliers given technology state j and
sub-game equilibrium k = I,M where I stands for independent suppliers
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and M for a single supplier. Condition (3.56) is given by
α2(128− 256γ − 40γ2 + 1923 − 10γ4 − 6γ5 + 3γ6 − 11γ7)
3(γ − 2)2(1 + γ)(16− 7γ2)2 ≥ 0 (3.58)
and condition (3.57) can be expressed as
8α2(γ4 − 4γ3 + 6γ2 − 10γ + 4)
3(γ + 1)(γ + 2)(γ − 4)2(γ − 2)2 ≥ 0. (3.59)
The effect of the degree of product differentiation on the payoffs of up-
stream firms can be expressed graphically. Figure 3.3 depicts suppliers’ total
surplus in all technology states as a function of γ. The surplus of upstream
firms is at first the highest in (F,F) technology state and decreases in γ.
When products become close substitutes, however, the negative externality
posed by downstream firms increases the rivalry in the input market to such
extent, that the payoff in (F,F) state becomes smaller than in (D,D) state.
Consequently, (3.58) and (3.59) hold only for some values of γ. In this par-
ticular case, i.e. when α = 10, (3.58) holds for γ ∈ [−1, 0.6] and (3.59) is true
for γ ∈ [−1, 0.51]. Then, the surplus of upstream firms is maximized when
both downstream firms use D technology. In other words, suppliers prefer to
maintain exclusive relations with producers.
Figure 3.3: Suppliers’ surplus (independent suppliers, α=10)
Let us now consider the case when there is one multi-product supplier.
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From the previous analysis we know that the monopolistic supplier is always
able to set prices that maximize monopolist’s profit in all technology cases,
i.e. wXMj = wYMj = α2 . The possibility to set monopolistic prices for both
inputs offsets the negative effects of increased intra-brand competition. Con-
sequently, by selling both inputs to both downstream firms, a single supplier
always benefits from a higher demand stimulated by the use of FPT. This
leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3: The profit of a multi-product monopolistic sup-
plier is the highest when both manufacturers use FPT.
Proof. See annex.
Figure 3.4: Suppliers’ surplus (a single supplier, α=10)
Because the choice of technology made by downstream firms determines
the final quantities of both products and, as a result, the demand for in-
termediate inputs, it has also an impact on the seller’s final payoff. The
total payoff of the upstream industry is however less sensitive to the degree
of product differentiation and the technology choice when there is only a
monopolistic supplier of both inputs, compared to the structure with two
independent suppliers. Again, this can be illustrated graphically. Figure 3.4
shows that, although product substitutability is negatively related to the to-
tal payoff, a multi-product monopoly always maximizes its profit when each
manufacturer is active in both parts of the market.
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The above findings differs from the result obtained by Lin (1990). Accord-
ing to him, upstream firms prefer to choose exclusive dealing relations with
downstream firms, which allow them to earn greater profits. In the current
setting, however, provided that products are either complements or moderate
substitutes, independent suppliers would benefit from downstream competi-
tion that has a direct impact on the quantities ordered by downstream firms.
The total payoff of a monopolistic multiproduct supplier is always maximized
when both manufacturers serve the two parts of the market.
Downstream firms
Intuitively, downstream companies forsake some profits when they are ac-
tive in only one part of the market. By using D technology, each firm ex-
cludes itself from the other part of the market and reduces its final payoff.
However, according to Röller et al. (1990), when both firms invest into
flexible production technologies they reduce their profits due to increased
rivalry in both parts of the market. Only one firm can benefit from produc-
ing both goods provided that the other firm supplies only one part of the
market. Consequently, because producers collectively forsake profits when
both of them adopt F technology, the technology choice takes a form of a
Prisoners’ Dilemma. Thus, the answer to the question of what technology
downstream firm should choose to maximize its payoff might not be straight-
forward. Therefore, proceeding as before, in the following section I analyze
the payoffs to the downstream manufacturers in all technology states and
under both structures of the upstream industry. The main question here is
which technology maximizes producers’ profits.
First, I would like to discuss this question under the assumption that
upstream industry has a competitive structure. Downstream firms might be
inclined to adopt FPT in order to increase the product range. This, however,
might have adverse impact on their final payoffs. Similarly as in the case of
the input market, the competition and profits in the final product market will
be influenced by the type of dependency between both products. To see this,
let us turn to a graphical representation of producers’ profits in all technology
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Figure 3.5: Producers’ surplus (independent suppliers, α=10, s=0.5)
states. Figure 3.5 illustrates producers’ payoffs for α = 10 and s = 0.5. It
can be seen that producers’ payoff is maximized in (F,F) technology state for
a very limited range of γ. For most of the values of γ producers are better
off when they remain with specialized equipment or when only one of them
invests in FPT. Thus, an analysis of the manufacturers’ surplus leads to the
following Lemma:
Lemma 4: If PSIj = piPI1,j + piPI2,j is the total profit of the down-
stream industry in technology state j, given a competitive struc-
ture of the upstream industry I, and when α = 10 and s = 0.5
then:
a) PSI1 ≥ PSI2 = PSI3 if γ ∈ [−0.65, 0.24];
b) PSI1 ≥ PSI4 if γ ∈ [−0.75, 0.32];
c) PSI4 ≥ PSI2 = PSI3 if γ ∈ [0.54, 0.95];
Proof. See annex.
Consequently, as it emerges from the above discussion, it is not always
optimal from producers’ stand point when both firms invest in flexible tech-
nologies.
Proceeding as above, let us now turn to the equilibrium outcomes that
emerge under a monopolized upstream industry. Figure 3.6 illustrates the
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surplus of downstream firms for α = 10 and s = 0.5. It can be seen that
the negative effect of FPT on producers’ profits is even stronger when inputs
are procured from a multi-product monopolist. Nearly over the entire range
of γ downstream firms maximize the total industry profit when they remain
active in separated markets. An analysis of producers’ payoffs leads to the
following the following lemma:
Lemma 5: If PSMj = piPM1,j + piPM2,j is the total profit of the
downstream industry in technology state j, given a monopolistic
structure of the upstream industry M , and when α = 10 and
s = 0.5 then:
a) PSM1 ≥ PSM2 = PSM3 if γ ∈ [−0.39, 1];
b) PSM1 ≥ PSM4 if γ ∈ [−0.55, 1];
c) PSM4 ≤ PSM2 = PSM3 if γ ∈ [−1, 1].
Proof: See annex.
Lemma 5 implies that the payoffs of downstream firms decrease in γ and as
the level of product complementarity decreases or products become stronger
substitutes, companies forsake profits when they use FPT. This counters the
intuition that firms can increase their payoffs by diversification. This leads
to the following proposition:
Proposition 4: In equilibrium outcomes, the cumulative profit
of downstream firms depends on the market size and the degree of
product differentiation. The use of FPT by both producers never
maximizes the total payoff of the downstream industry.
Proof of the above proposition follows from the proof of Lemma 5 (see
annex).
To a large extent these results are consistent with those by Röller et al.
(1990). In particular, they confirm that, in most of the cases, an extension of
the product range is detrimental to the producers’ total payoff. Although the
ability to produce many products leads to a significant increase in the profits
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Figure 3.6: Producers’ surplus (a single supplier, α=10, s=0.5)
of the producer switching from DPT to FPT, it happens at the expense
of the other producer. Once both producers adopt FPT, the result is an
immediate increase of intra-brand competition and the introduction of inter-
brand rivalry. Eventually, both firms are worse off when they parallel choose
flexible production technology. Obviously, this leads to a Prisoners’ Dilemma.
3.5.3 Total welfare
This section discusses the effects of technology choice by downstream firms
and consolidation of the upstream industry on total welfare. As usual, total
welfare includes consumer surplus and total profits of both industries. Table
3.3 gives expressions for total welfare in all technology states and under both
structures of the upstream industry.
Let us first consider the effect of technology choice by producers when
there are two independent suppliers. Intuitively, FPT has a competition-
increasing effect. Consequently, total welfare should be maximized when
downstream firms choose F technology and supply both products. Then,
from the social point of view, total welfare should be increased as the supply
in the final market rises and prices decrease. To see this, let us turn to
a graphical illustration. Figure 3.7 shows that the use of F technology by
both firms is socially desirable indeed, but only to some extent. Surprisingly,
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Table 3.3: Total welfare
Independent suppliers
(D,D) 4α2(γ+1)(γ−4)2(γ+2)2 − 2
Mixed equilibrium α2(365γ5−971γ4−3016γ3−6640γ2+4352γ+9152)72(γ+1)(7γ2−16)2 − 2− s
(F,F) 4α2(5−3γ)9(γ+1)(γ−2)2 − 2(s+ 1)
A single supplier
(D,D) α2(3γ+7)4(γ+2)2 − 2
Mixed equilibrium α2(17γ+143)288(γ+1) − 2− s
(F,F) 5α29(γ+1) − 2(s+ 1)
the presence of both firms in both parts of the market is desirable from
the social welfare perspective only if γ ≤ 0.95. When products are strong
substitutes, asymmetric solution, in which one firm uses D technology and
the other F technology, is preferred. In other words, if products are strong
substitutes investing in FPT by both firms might be socially not efficient.
This coincides with the previous conclusion regarding the possible technology
outcomes under a competitive market structure. As illustrated in Figure 3.2,
mixed equilibria could emerge if there were two independent suppliers in the
region of γ close to 1. Thus, theoretically, there would be no concern of
overinvestment in FPT. However, in such a case, downstream firms face a
Prisoners’ Dilemma, because, when both firms invest into flexible production
technologies they reduce their profits due to increased rivalry in both parts of
the market. Only one firm can benefit from producing both goods provided
that the other firm supplies only one part of the market.
Let us now turn to a sub-game with a multi-product monopolistic sup-
plier. As illustrated in figure 3.8, the negative effect of FPT on producers’
payoff is even stronger when there is a monopolistic supplier of both inputs.
Consequently, this indicates that when products are substitutable, invest-
ment into FPT might not be desired from the social welfare standpoint. The
benefits of increased competition between closely substitutable products do
not justify large investments into new production technologies. This result
holds for both types of the upstream industry structure. Consequently, the
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Figure 3.7: Total surplus (independent suppliers, α=10, s=0.5)
following can be stated:
Proposition 5: When final products are sufficiently differenti-
ated, the investment in FPT by both companies maximizes total
welfare.
Proof. See annex.
Figure 3.8: Total surplus (a single supplier, α=10, s=0.5)
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3.5.4 Total welfare and equilibrium technology choice
Taking stock of the implications of the technology choice and the structure
of the upstream industry on the total surplus, it is worthwhile to ask to
what extent equilibrium technology choice of downstream firms overlap with
what is optimal from the total welfare point of view. Figure 3.9 illustrates
all technology equilibria that emerge in a sub-game with merged suppliers
together with the socially optimal outcomes in α and γ for a value of s = 0.5.
Again, plotting the figure for various parameters of s showes that the results
are not sensitive to the changes of parameter values. Regarding the equi-
librium technology choice, the region below the red (D,D)m curve includes
the technology state in which both downstream firms remain with dedicated
technology. The surface above the blue (F,F)m curve shows the technology
state in which both firms switch to flexible technology. The area between
(D,D)m and (F,F)m includes mixed technology choices.
Regarding the socially optimal outcomes, the following curves illustrate
the differences between the total welfare values under various technology
states. In particular, the green line indicates the borderline for the condition
that total welfare in a mixed outcome is greater than total welfare in (D,D)
state, i.e. Wmmixed −Wm1 ≥ 0. Similarly, the violet and orange lines show for
what values of α and γ total welfare in (F,F) state is greater than in the (D,D)
and the mixed state respectively, i.e. Wm4 −Wm1 ≥ 0 and Wm4 −WmMixed ≥ 0.
An analysis of the equilibrium and the socially optimal welfare regions
leads to the conclusion that, for some range of α, the choice of manufacturers
does not lead to a socially efficient outcome. In general, producers invest in
flexible production technologies only when market is sufficiently large. For
example, when products are complements, the socially optimal move from
the (D,D) state to the mixed state lies above the green curve. In contrast,
manufacturers choose the mixed equilibrium for the region of α and γ that
lies between the red and blue curves. Similarly, the equilibrium move from
a mixed case to the (F,F) outcome lies above the blue curve, although the
socially optimal choice of FPT by both manufacturers would be for much
smaller value of α, i.e. above the orange curve.
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Figure 3.9: Total surplus and technology equilibria (a single supplier, s=0.5)
Thus, it can be seen that firms invest into FPT for much larger values
of α (above the blue line) than socially optimal (above the violet curve). In
short, the socially inefficient outcomes emerge for values of α that lie:
• between the green and red lines when products are complements, and
• between the violet and blue lines for all types of products.
An additional analysis of the manufacturers’ choice and the socially opti-
mal outcome under a competitive structure of the upstream industry revealed
that the type of the upstream industry structure does not move producers
to an outcome, which would be desirable from the total welfare point of
view. Consequently, for some intermediate size of market there is a diver-
gence between the manufacturers’ incentives and socially optimal outcome.
The above results can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 6: There is a set of α for which the manufacturers’
choice does not lead to a socially efficient outcome with respect to
the technology choice. In general, manufacturers choose to invest
in FPT in much larger markets than it would be desirable from
the social point of view.
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Proof. See annex.
3.6 Conclusions
The starting point of the discussion presented in this chapter was the argu-
ment of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) that the adoption of FPT accompanied
by complementary changes in firms’ strategy and organization change modern
manufacturing and service industries. The current work aimed at illustrat-
ing these transformations and analyzing manufacturers’ decisions regarding
the choice of production technologies in the context of vertical relations. By
using a model of two supply chains, I show that the effects of the adoption
of flexible production equipment on firms’ profits and welfare is far from
straightforward.
First, although profitable for an individual producer, the adoption of tech-
nologies increasing product variety across the entire industry erodes produc-
ers’ payoffs. Despite the fact that, in some cases, mixed technology states
in which one firm uses flexible and the other dedicated technology can be
justified, downstream firms are better off when they remain with specialized
equipment and produce only one product. In particular, when products are
close substitutes, any benefits stemming from an increased product variety
do not justify investments into flexible technology by all firms in the industry.
As a result, producers end up in a Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Second, the introduction of flexible technologies on the payoff of the up-
stream industry is not straightforward as well. Contrary to some previous
findings, I show that, regardless of the upstream market structure, the up-
stream industry is always better off when both downstream firms use FPT. In
particular, a multiproduct monopolistic suppliers benefits from an increased
demand for both inputs. However, these benefits diminish as products be-
come close substitutes.
Third, regarding the structure of the upstream industry, suppliers maxi-
mize their profits when they merge in all cases, i.e. irrespective of the degree
of product differentiation. Consequently, along consumers, a multiproduct
monopolistic supplier always benefits from manufacturers’ move towards new
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technologies and greater product variety.
Finally, the decisions made by producers with respect to the technology
choice are not always efficient from the social welfare point of view. In par-
ticular, firms invest into new technologies only when markets are sufficiently
large.
One of the limitations of the current work is that the design of the model
influences the results. Consequently, it might be worthwhile to check their
robustness under different frameworks. One way to extend the current struc-
ture would be an introduction of a bargaining game between upstream and
downstream firms over two-part contracts, instead of a price maximization
and Cournot competition. Another way is to relax the assumption with re-
spect to the number of firms. Nevertheless, despite its simple framework,
the model can be applied to a number of realistic situations. Furthermore,
the results obtained here seem to reflex anecdotal and empirical evidence
on the technology-driven impacts on vertical relations and firms’ strategies
regarding product variety as well.
Concluding, the impacts of value chain transformation and the diffusion
of FPT might go far beyond the increased product variety offered by firms.
Other changes that can be triggered by the technological transition might
include intensified competition in product and input markets. Eventually, the
changes might have adverse effect on firms that seek to escape competition
and increase profitability by the adoption of new technologies.
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3.7 Annex
3.7.1 Tables
Table 3.4: Equilibrium expressions for all technology states (independent
suppliers)
Upstream (D,D) (F,D)* (F,F)
wXI∗j
α(γ−2)
(γ−4)
α(γ3−5γ2−4γ−8)
16−7γ2
α(γ−1)
(γ−2)
wY I∗j
α(γ−2)
(γ−4)
α(5γ2+3γ−8)
7γ2−16
α(γ−1)
(γ−2)
piU∗1,j
2α2(2−γ)
(γ+2)(γ−4)2
−α(γ5−9γ4+8γ3+64γ2−64)
2(γ+1)(7γ2−16)2
2α2(1−γ)
3(γ−2)2(γ+1)
piU∗2,j
2α2(2−γ)
(γ+2)(γ−4)2
α(25γ5+65γ4−116γ3−284γ2+64γ+256)
6(γ+1)(7γ2−16)2
2α2(1−γ)
3(γ−2)2(γ+1)
Downstream
xI∗1,j , x
I∗
2,j
2α
(γ+2)(4−γ) , 0
α(γ2−4γ−8)
2(γ+1)(7γ2−16) , 0
α
3(2−γ)(γ+1) ,
α
3(2−γ)(γ+1)
yI∗1,j , y
I∗
2,j 0,
2α
(γ+2)(4−γ)
α(γ3+10γ2+2γ−16)
6(γ+1)(7γ2−16) ,
α(2γ2−3γ−8)
3(7γ2−16)
α
3(2−γ)(γ+1) ,
α
3(2−γ)(γ+1)
pXI∗j
α(γ2−6)
(γ−4)(γ+2)
α(5γ3−39γ2−20γ+72)
6(16−7γ2)
α(3γ−4)
3(γ−2)
pY I∗j
α(γ2−6)
(γ−4)(γ+2)
α(17γ2+6γ−32)
3(7γ2−16)
α(3γ−4)
3(γ−2)
piPI∗1,j
4α2
(γ+2)2(γ−4)2 − 1
α2(γ3+7γ2−28γ−52)
36(γ+1)(7γ2−16) − 1− s 2α
2
9(γ−2)2(γ+1) − 1− s
piPI∗2,j
4α2
(γ+2)2(γ−4)2 − 1
α2(2γ2−3γ−8)2
9(7γ2−16)2 − 1 2α
2
9(γ−2)2(γ+1) − 1− s
* In (D,F) equilibrium the reverse is true
Table 3.5: Equilibrium expressions for all technology states (a single supplier)
Upstream (D,D) (F,D)* (F,F)
wXM∗j , w
YM∗
j
α
2
α
2
α
2
piM∗j
α2
2(γ+2)
α2(γ+7)
24(γ+1)
α2
3(γ+1)
Downstream
xM∗1,j , x
M∗
2,j
2α
2(γ+2) , 0
α
4(γ+1) , 0
α
6(γ+1) ,
α
6(γ+1)
yM∗1,j , y
M∗
2,j 0, 2α2(γ+2)
α(2−γ)
12(γ+1) ,
α
6
α
6(γ+1) ,
α
6(γ+1)
pXM∗j
α(γ+3)
2(γ+2)
α(9−γ)
12
2α
3
pYM∗j
α(γ+3)
2(γ+2)
2α
3
2α
3
piPM∗1,j
α2
4(γ+2)2 − 1 α
2(13−5γ)
144(γ+1) − 1− s α
2
18(γ+1) − 1− s
piPM∗2,j
α2
4(γ+2)2 − 1 α
2
36 − 1 α
2
18(γ+1) − 1− s
* In (D,F) equilibrium the reverse is true
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3.7.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3:
a) Providing that suppliers are independent, consumer surplus is maxi-
mized in (F,F) technology state when the following conditions are satisfied.
First, consumer surplus in mixed technology state must be lower than con-
sumer surplus in (F,F) technology outcome. This is true when
CSI4 − CSI2 ≥ 0 and CSI4 − CSI3 ≥ 0 (3.60)
Second, consumer surplus in mixed equilibria must be higher than consumer
surplus in (D,D) technology state. This is true when
CSI2 − CSI1 ≥ 0 and CSI3 − CSI1 ≥ 0 (3.61)
Condition (3.60) can be expressed in the following way:
α2(1792− 768γ − 896γ2 + 32γ3 − 596γ4 + 224γ5 + 267γ6 − 55γ7)
72(γ + 1)(γ − 2)2(7γ2 − 16)2 ≥ 0
(3.62)
Similarly, condition (3.61) can be written as
α2(28672 + 18432γ + 17664γ2 + 55040γ3 + 23712γ4 − 16128γ5 − 9436γ6 − 1104γ7 − 267γ8 + 55γ9)
72(γ + 1)(γ − 4)2(γ + 2)2(7γ2 − 16)2 ≥ 0
(3.63)
It can be shown graphically that both conditions are fulfilled for the relevant
rage of γ ∈ [−1, 1] and α > 0.
Q.E.D.
b) Proceeding as above, it is enough to show that two conditions are
satisfied. First, consumer surplus in mixed equilibria must be lower than
consumer surplus in (F,F) equilibrium. This is true when
CSM4 − CSM2 ≥ 0 and CSM4 − CSM3 ≥ 0 (3.64)
Second, consumer surplus in mixed equilibria must be higher than consumer
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surplus in (D,D) equilibrium. This is true when
CSM2 − CSM1 ≥ 0 and CSM3 − CSM1 ≥ 0 (3.65)
Condition (3.64) can be expressed as:
7α2(1− γ)
288(γ + 1) ≥ 0 (3.66)
Similarly, condition (3.65) can be written as
α2(7γ3 − 19γ2 − 16γ + 28)
288(γ + 1)(γ + 2)2 ≥ 0 (3.67)
Both expressions, (3.66) and (3.67), are fulfilled for all values of γ.
Q.E.D.
c) and d) These results hold when the difference between consumer
surplus in (F,F) with independent suppliers and consumer surplus in the same
technology state but with a monopolistic input market is positive (negative)
if products are substitutes (complements). This holds when
CSI4 − CSM4 ≥ 0 (3.68)
or
α2γ(4− γ)
9(γ − 2)2(1 + γ) ≥ 0 (3.69)
for 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and
CSI4 − CSM4 < 0 (3.70)
or
α2γ(4− γ)
9(γ − 2)2(1 + γ) < 0 (3.71)
for 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. It is straightforward to see that the sign of both inequalities
depends on the sign of γ and that both conditions are satisfied for relevant
types of products.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4:
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a) To prove this result, it needs be to shown that
PSI1 − PSI2 ≥ 0 and PSI1 − PSI3 ≥ 0 (3.72)
hold for some value of γ. PSIj represents total payoffs of downstream pro-
ducers given technology state j and upstream market structure I. Condition
(3.72) is equivalent to
s− α
2(23γ9 − 75γ8 − 696γ7 + 1564γ6 − 5472γ5 − 22272γ4 + 14848γ3 + 56064γ2 + 18432γ − 4096)
36(γ + 1)(γ − 4)2(γ + 2)2(7γ2 − 16)2 ≥ 0
(3.73)
and it can be shown graphically that it holds for some value of α and s.
For example, if we set α = 10 and s = 0.5 then PSI1 ≥ PSI2 = PSI3 if
γ ∈ [−0.65, 0.24].
Q.E.D.
b) To prove this result, it needs be to shown that
PSI1 − PSI4 ≥ 0. (3.74)
This can be expressed as
2s− 4α
2(γ4 − 22γ3 + 42γ2 + 32γ − 8)
9(γ + 1)(γ − 2)2(γ2 − 2γ − 8)2 ≥ 0 (3.75)
Again, it can be shown that if we set α = 10 and s = 0.5, (3.75) holds for
γ ∈ [−0.75, 0.32].
Q.E.D.
c) To prove this result, it needs be to shown that
PSI4 − PSI2 ≥ 0 and PSI4 − PSI3 ≥ 0 (3.76)
hold for some γ. This can be expressed as
−α
2(23γ7 − 75γ6 − 328γ5 + 316γ4 + 992γ3 − 416γ2 − 768γ + 256)
36(1 + γ)(γ − 2)2(7γ2 − 16)2 − s ≥ 0
(3.77)
Again, by setting α = 10 and s = 0.5 it can be shown graphically that it
holds for γ ∈ [0.54, 0.95].
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5:
a) This result if true when
PSM1 − PSM2 ≥ 0 and PSM1 − PSM3 ≥ 0 (3.78)
hold for some values of γ. Inequality (3.78) can be written as
α2(γ3 − 13γ2 + 8γ + 4)
144(1 + γ)(γ − 2)2 + s ≥ 0 (3.79)
This holds for positive α and s 6= 0. For example, if α = 10 and s = 0.5 the
above expression is fulfilled when γ ∈ [−0.39, 1].
Q.E.D.
b) This result if true when
PSM1 − PSM4 ≥ 0 (3.80)
is true for some positive values of γ. Condition (3.80) can be written as
2s− α
2(2γ2 − γ − 1)
18(γ + 1)(γ + 2)2 ≥ 0 (3.81)
Again, it can be shown that for positive α and s 6= 0, the above condition is
fulfilled when γ ∈ [−0.55, 1].
Q.E.D.
c) This result if true when
PSM4 − PSM2 ≤ 0 and PSM4 − PSM3 ≤ 0 (3.82)
is true for some positive values of γ. Condition (3.80) can be written as
α2(γ − 1)
144(γ + 1) − s ≤ 0 (3.83)
Again, it can be shown graphically that for positive α and s 6= 0, the above
condition is fulfilled for all relevant values of γ.
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. In order to prove this proposition, it is enough
to show that
USM4 − USM2 ≥ 0 and USM4 − USM3 ≥ 0 (3.84)
and
USM4 − USM1 ≥ 0 (3.85)
Inequality (3.84) is given by
α2(1− γ)
24(1 + γ) ≥ 0 (3.86)
and condition (3.85) can be written as
α2(1− γ)
6(γ2 + 3γ + 2) ≥ 0 (3.87)
It is straightforward that both are positive for all values of γ.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. In order to prove this proposition, it is neces-
sary to show that for some values of γ close to 1 total welfare is not maximized
when both producers are active in both markets. Let us first start with the
case in which there are two suppliers. Then the following conditions must be
met:
W I4 −W I2 ≥ 0 and W I4 −W I3 ≥ 0 (3.88)
and
W I4 −W I1 ≥ 0 (3.89)
Where W kj represents total welfare given technology state j and sub-game
equilibrium k = I,M where I stands for independent suppliers and M for a
single supplier. Condition (3.88) is given by
α2(4352− 5376γ − 1024γ2 + 2656γ3 − 1468γ4 + 736γ5 + 489γ6 − 365γ7)
72(1 + γ)(32− 16γ − 14γ2 + 7γ3)2 − s ≥ 0 (3.90)
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and (3.89) can be expressed as
4α2(2168− 2208γ − 978γ2 + 238γ3 − 273γ4 + 246γ5 − 67γ66γ7)
9(γ − 4)4(1 + γ)(γ2 − 4)2 − 2s ≥ 0
(3.91)
It can be shown graphically that for positive α and s 6= 0. both conditions are
fulfilled. For example, if α = 10 and s = 0.5 condition (3.90) is satisfied for
γ ∈ [−1, 0.95], i.e. except when products are strong substitutes. Condition
(3.91) holds for all values of γ.
Second, considering the case in which there is a multi-product monopo-
listic supplier, it is necessary to show that
WM4 −WM2 ≤ 0 and WM4 −WM3 ≤ 0 (3.92)
and
WM4 −WM1 ≤ 0 (3.93)
hold for some values of γ. Condition (3.92) can be expressed as
17α2(1− γ)
288(1 + γ) − s ≤ 0 (3.94)
Similarly, condition (3.93) is equivalent to
α2(17− 10γ − 7γ2)
36(γ + 2)2(1 + γ) − 2s ≤ 0 (3.95)
Proceeding as above, it can be illustrated that both expressions are fulfilled
for positive α and s 6= 0. For example, if α = 10 and s = 0.5, (3.94) holds
for γ ∈ [0.84, 1] and (3.95) holds when γ ∈ [0.78, 1].
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. To prove this proposition, it is necessary
to show that, for some values of α, the equilibrium regions of technology
choice under a monopolized upstream market do not overlap with the socially
efficient outcomes. Thus, let us start with complementary products and
consider the case of the move from the (D,D) to the mixed technology state.
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It can be shown that the condition for a socially efficient adoption of FPT
by one producer needs to satisfy the following inequality:
WM2 −WM1 ≥ 0 and WM3 −WM1 ≥ 0, (3.96)
which is equivalent to
α ≥
√
s
fMDD2Mix(γ)
, (3.97)
where
fMDD2Mix(γ) =
(68− 80γ − 5γ2 + 17γ3)
288(γ + 2)2(1 + γ) . (3.98)
From Proposition 1 in section 3.4, we know that there is a mixed equilibrium
for complementary products when
√
s
fMDD(γ)
≤ α < √ s
fMFF (γ)
. Thus, to show
that the choice of manufacturers does not lead to a socially optimal outcome
it needs to be proved that the following condition is met:
fMDD2Mix(γ)− fMDD(γ) ≥ 0, (3.99)
which can be expressed as
(3γ2 − 5γ + 2)
32(γ + 2)(1 + γ) ≥ 0. (3.100)
It can be seen that for complementary products the above condition is
always satisfied. In other words, there are some values of α in which mixed
equilibria would be socially efficient, but they do not exist, as companies
consider such markets as too small.
Second, considering further the case of complementary products, it needs
to be shown that, for some values of α, companies do not move from mixed
technology equilibria to the (F,F) technology state, although it would be
socially desirable. The adoption of FPT by both companies versus only one
is socially efficient when:
WM4 −WM2 ≥ 0 and WM4 −WM3 ≥ 0, (3.101)
92
which is equivalent to
α ≥
√
s
fMMix2FF (γ)
, (3.102)
where
fMMix2FF (γ) =
17(1− γ)
288(1 + γ) . (3.103)
From Proposition 1 in section 3.4, we know that there is a (F,F) equilibrium
for complementary products when α ≥ √ s
fMFF (γ)
. Thus, if the choice of manu-
facturers does not lead to a socially optimal outcome the following condition
must hold:
fMMix2FF (γ)− fMFF (γ) ≥ 0, (3.104)
which can be expressed as
1− γ
32(1 + γ) ≥ 0. (3.105)
Again, it is straightforward that, for complementary products, the above
condition is always satisfied.
Lastly, it needs to be shown that, for some values of α, companies do not
move from the (D,D) equilibrium to the (F,F) technology state, although it
would be socially desirable. The adoption of FPT by both companies versus
the (D,D) state is socially efficient when:
WM4 −WM1 ≥ 0, (3.106)
which is equivalent to
α ≥
√
s
fMDD2FF (γ)
, (3.107)
where
fM
DD2FF
(γ) = 17− 10γ − 7γ
2
36(1 + γ)(2 + γ)2 . (3.108)
From Proposition 1 in section 3.4, we know that both companies choose
to invest into FPT when α ≥ √ s
fMFF (γ)
. Thus, to show that the choice of
manufacturers does not lead to a socially optimal outcome it needs to be
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proved that the following condition is met:
fMDD2FF (γ)− fMFF (γ) ≥ 0, (3.109)
which can be expressed as
γ3 − 4γ2 − 10γ + 13
36(1 + γ)(2 + γ)2 ≥ 0. (3.110)
Again, it is easy to see that the above condition is always satisfied. Con-
cluding, taking into account that conditions (3.100), (3.105) and (3.110) are
satisfied for the relevant range of γ, it has been proved that for some interme-
diary value of α, the decisions of downstream firms deliver socially inefficient
outcomes. Q.E.D.
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Chapter 4
The impact of e-procurement
on the number of suppliers
4.1 Introduction
Information and communication technologies (ICT) such as electronic pro-
curement have been expected to have considerable impact on the supplier-
buyer relations and the organization of economic activity since the beginning
of their rapid proliferation. The first prediction based on the transaction cost
theory (Coase (1937)) said that the use of electronic transaction technolo-
gies and practices would result in more market-based relations between firms
(Malone et al. (1987)). The opponents argued, however, that relationship-
specific investments, asset specificity and product complexity effectively pro-
hibit companies from engaging in pure market transactions. As a result, firms
will continue to internalize business activities to overcome market deficiencies
(Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993) and (1993a)). Following the Williamson’s
definition of hybrid organizational form (Williamson (1991)), it was argued
that a new organizational form would emerge that would combine elements
of both markets and hierarchies. The alternative paradigm was labelled as
move to the middle.
So far, however, there is still a lack of a consistent theoretical framework
specific to the supplier-buyer relations and electronic networks and there are
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only few attempts to design a framework for understanding the nature of
supplier-buyer relations as a consequence of the use of internet transaction
applications (e.g. Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993 and 1993a), Jap and Mohr
(2002), Chen and Paulraj (2004) and Wagner and Essig (2006)). Most of
the approaches generalize the concept of ICT and do not account for the
fact that various ICT applications are adopted to serve different purposes
and, therefore, have diverse effects on company conduct. Similar, empirical
studies suffer from the inadequate and generalized conceptualization of ICT
and measurement of the impact of electronic transaction applications on the
organization of economic activity and supplier-buyer relations (e.g. Steinfield
et al. (1995) and Min et al. (2001)). Furthermore, a number of studies is
based on anecdotal evidence rather than on a large sample of data (e.g.
Roberts et al. (1998) and McIvor et al. (2000)). Consequently, empirical
attempts yielded inconclusive results as well (e.g. Steinfield et al. (1995),
Chan et al. (1999) and Forman et al. (2005)).
Aiming to fill the gap in understanding the relationship between electronic
procurement and its impact on the organization of vertical relations, I ana-
lyze the impact of electronic procurement on the number of suppliers. The
main questions of interest here is whether the brokerage effect of electronic
procurement enables firms to increase the number of suppliers, or whether
the coordination effect of this application reinforces the relationships between
firms and leads to the creation of hybrid organization forms (Malone et al.
(1987)). In order to understand these interactions, I review the main con-
clusions from the relevant literature and illustrate the interactions between
the technology deployed in the context of vertical relations and its impact on
the supplier number with a simple conceptual model. Apart from the com-
monly recognized effects of electronic procurement, such as lower transaction
and coordination cost (Malone et al. (1987)), I postulate that the impact
of electronic procurement on supplier competition is another element which
shapes firms’ sourcing strategies and the supplier-buyer relations. Taking
this as a starting point, I formulate hypotheses with respect to the effects
of electronic procurement technology and practices on the sourcing strategy
as a function of transaction cost and asset specificity. I test these hypothe-
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ses by using a multinominal logit model of a supplier number change. In
the analysis, I use data on the ICT use and its impact collected within the
e-Business W@tch 2006 survey. This unique data set enables me to include
variables controlling for the impact of ICT on transaction costs, asset speci-
ficity, transaction economies of scale and geographical proximity to supplier
and basic characteristics of the surveyed firms.
The results reveal that, in general, electronic procurement leads to an
increase in the number of suppliers. Thus, these observations contradict
the predictions that ICT leads to a dominance of network-like organizational
forms and supports the view that ICT increases the attractiveness of markets
as an organizational form of economic activity (Clemons et al. (1993)). The
analysis provides evidence that the motivations to move to the market can be
explained by the positive impact of ICT on transaction cost and the trans-
action economies of scale. However, despite a positive impact of electronic
procurement on the cost of procurement, some firms choose to decrease the
number of their suppliers. In particular, firm size and age seem to be impor-
tant determinants of what are the implications of electronic procurement on
the relationships with suppliers and the number of sourcing options. This is
consistent with the risk-augmented transaction cost perspective (Kauffman
and Mohtadi (2004)), which predicts that the risk preferences with respect to
supply certainty shape companies decision on the choice of the procurement
mode and the relationship with suppliers. As a result, large firms are more
likely to adopt costlier solutions, as they offer them more certain-to-deliver
value. In contrast, smaller firms tend to choose applications that minimize
transaction costs, on the one hand, and whose use entails greater supply
uncertainties, on the other hand.
The implications of these results can be summarized as follows. First,
electronic procurement combined with changes in sourcing strategy leads to
a reduction of transaction costs and, as a result, opens up new possibilities
in terms of how business activities can be organized or how to structure
competition in upstream markets. This is of course of great importance
for companies whose customers implement electronic procurement, because
it can be used to intensify competition in their market. As a result, it will
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change their environment and force them to look for new ways of maintaining
profitability. Second, the example of electronic procurement shows that the
impact of ICT on the way firms organize their activities is far from straight-
forward. Consequently, any technology implementation project should take
into account the interactions between technology, organization and its envi-
ronment. Similarly, the current analysis shows that empirical studies that
generalize ICT by proxing the technology use by ICT expenditures or ICT
endowment neglect the fact that various applications are adopted for differ-
ent strategic reasons, in different contexts and within different environments
(for literature review see, for example, Forman and Goldfarb (2005)). Con-
sequently, they have different implications for companies’ organization and
performance. ICT constitutes of heterogeneous applications and therefore
one should expect heterogeneous implications of different applications on
firm activities and performance.
The approach taken in this study exhibits considerable differences to other
studies aiming at answering the question of how electronic procurement influ-
ences the number of sourcing options. In particular, I focus here only on one
ICT application and its effect on one strategic variable of the supplier-buyer
relations. Furthermore, by using survey data, I make use of over 14,000
representative observations of ICT use and its impact across a number of
industries. Despite clear advantages over the case-study methodology, this
approach has some drawbacks as well. Most importantly, it does not allow
to distinguish between various types of applications, e.g. between open and
closed networks, and the transaction types, although both of them might
have important implications for companies’ sourcing decisions. Nevertheless,
as far as I am aware, the current analysis is the first approach to study the
effect of electronic procurement on the supplier-buyer relationships by using
a large number of observations across various industries.
The remaining part of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2
reviews the discussion on the impact of ICT on firm boundaries and sourcing
strategy and establishes a conceptual foundation for further empirical exam-
ination. Section 4.3 describes the data used in the study and presents some
descriptive statistics illustrating companies’ choices regarding the optimal
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number of suppliers as a function of the electronic procurement deployment.
Section 4.4 presents the findings and discusses the limitations of this analysis.
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 E-procurement and supplier-buyer rela-
tions
4.2.1 Literature review
Transaction cost theory predicts that decreasing costs of search, evaluation
and monitoring of suppliers should lead to a shift toward markets as a form
of organizing economic activity (Coase (1937), Williamson (1985)). Con-
sequently, the expectations regarding the potential of ICT as technologies
introducing innovative ways of doing business, re-shaping firm boundaries
and changing the constellations of value chains were enormous (e.g. John-
ston et al. (1988), Milgrom et al. (1990), Fulk et al. (1995)). Among
others, electronic procurement, seen as a technology driving transaction cost
down, was said to increase the attractiveness of markets at the cost of hier-
archies (Malone et al. (1987), Lucking-Reiley et al. (2001)). The prophecy
of friction-free markets spurred a vivid discussion on the impact of electronic
procurement on the organization of economic activity and supplier-buyer re-
lations. Pointing to the fact that inter-firm transactions do not depend only
on the cost of searching and evaluating new suppliers, critics deemed the
expectations of the move to the market paradigm as premature. The most
important elements preventing companies from engaging into pure market
transactions include relationship specific investments, asset specificity and
market complexity (Klein et al. (1978), Williamson (1979)). Thus, in order
to overcome the problems arising from market deficiencies, companies inter-
nalize transactions. Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993, 1993a) argue that compa-
nies implementing ICT in general and supplier-buyer networks in particular
would benefit from reduced costs of information exchange and processing,
but they would not immediately move to markets. Instead, when relation-
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ship investments are indispensable or specific assets are procured firms will
create networks in which suppliers and buyers form closed business relation-
ships facilitated by ICT (Thompson (2004)). The paradigm explaining the
role of ICT in supporting the transformation towards a hybrid mode was
named a move to the middle (Johnston et al. (1988a), Clemons et al. (1993,
1994), Hennart (1993)).
One of the aspects of the electronic transaction applications’ impact on
organizing economic activity is the choice of the optimal number of suppli-
ers. According to the above discussion, it is likely that sourcing strategy
changes with electronic procurement in place. It is thus necessary to ask
whether the introduction of such applications leads to cooperation with a
larger number of suppliers, or to a close integration with few partners. The
former is suggested by the fact that a technology lowering searching and fil-
tering costs gives firms incentives to increase the number of sourcing options
in order to intensify the competition between suppliers and reduce suppliers’
bargaining position (Mukhopadhyay et al. (2002)). Thus, electronic pro-
curement indirectly increases upstream competition and lowers input prices.
The price effect, however, is not the only aspect a firm takes into account
while defining its sourcing strategy. The benefits of price effect have to be
weighted against coordination costs and supply risk, which increase with the
number of suppliers. In addition, even with electronic procurement at work,
the benefits of inter-firm cooperation are subject to learning curve effects
and in order to fully benefit from the introduction of a new application, both
parties need time to comprehend and adapt to the new organization of ac-
tivities (Clemons et al. (1995)). Similarly, because the coordination cost
decreases over time, firms can take advantage from transaction economies
of scale only if cooperation is maintained over a longer period of time and
sufficiently many transactions per relationship are carried out.
Despite an intensive debate, empirical evidence supporting any of the con-
tradictory paradigms remains scarce. On the one hand, Holland and Lockett
(1997) found that the process of supply chain integration is followed by a
reduction in the number of suppliers. Similarly, Dai et al. (2000) concluded
that firms indeed benefit from reduced coordination and search costs, but in
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some contexts buyers still maintain close relationships with selected suppliers
and various business models continue to coexist. On the other hand, Hitt
(1999) found that the use of ICT was associated with substantial decreases
in vertical integration and, hence, an increase of the supplier number. In
a study of a number of industries, Nepelski (2009) reported a clear move
to the market as a result of electronic procurement as well. Similar results
reveal the examination of the relationship between firm size and ICT invest-
ment conducted by Brynjolfsson et al. (1994) who concluded that increased
ICT expenditures were correlated with decreasing firm size and an increased
reliance on external sources.
However, there might be no simple answer to the question at stake. Ac-
cording to Morita and Nakahara (2003), the impact of electronic networks on
the supplier-buyer relations depends, among others, on the type of products
procured. On the one hand, electronic procurement reinforces the relation-
ship between buyer and supplier if complex products are produced. Due to
the highly specific nature of the investments in product design and other
skills, the manufacturer might decide to sole source a particular component
in spite of the benefits of electronic exchange channels offering it the access
to alternative sourcing options. On the other hand, if standardized products
are procured, electronic procurement enables manufactures to access a larger
pool of potential suppliers and to process information on prices and product
characteristics at a low cost. As a result, the number of suppliers from which
buyers procure commodities and standardized products might increase.
Further studies found that the impact of data networks on firms and value
chains might vary with other aspects as well. For example, Holland et al.
(1997) analyzed five companies operating in various industries and reported
that the organizations implemented inter-organizational applications to sup-
port both market and network-like forms of organizing transactions. The
proportion of market and hierarchy elements was contingent on a range of
market, strategy and economic variables. Similarly, Mühge (2004) concluded
that as the transaction complexity and asset specificity increase, the coor-
dination effect of ICT enforces hybrid structures and the attractiveness of
markets decreases.
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Apart from the price and coordination effects, the characteristics of the
technology deployed to facilitate business transactions have some implica-
tions for the sourcing mode. Typically, electronic networks facilitating the
interactions between a buyer and its suppliers requires some relationship-
specific investments. Since these investments are not contractible, a firm has
to offer its suppliers some incentives to commit some resources and ensure
that once the investments have been made they will earn positive profits af-
terwards (Bakos et al. (1997)). One way to convince a potential supplier to
undertake a necessary investment is to reduce bargaining power through lim-
iting the number of sourcing options and/or agreeing to deal with him over
a longer period of time. However, the argument of ICT-related relationship-
specific investment is slowly losing its validity. Unlike investments in other
capital goods, many ICT networks are not necessarily designed for a par-
ticular relationship. Hardware is usually standardized and deployable in
any relationship and software protocols are gradually evolving towards open
systems and modular architectures, independent of a particular industry or
business relationship. This further reduces the transaction cost and leads to
more market transactions.
Taking into account the above discussion, the following section formalizes
the relationship between technology choice and sourcing mode and formulates
hypotheses which are tested in section 4.4.
4.2.2 Conceptual model and hypotheses
Let us imagine an industry with a vertical structure where there are N >
1 upstream firms and one downstream firm. Upstream firms compete in
quantities, i.e. Cournot competition, and each sells qui of non-differentiated
input products to a downstream monopolist at price w. Downstream firm
faces demand function D(p) = 1 − p, where D′(p) < 0, and sells its output
at monopoly price p to final customers. For simplicity, it is assumed that all
upstream firms have neither production cost nor capacity constraints. Thus,
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each supplier faces the following maximization problem:
pii = wqui, (4.1)
and the profit function of a single downstream firm is
pid = D(p)p (4.2)
The monopoly’s production cost is equal to the input price w. Further-
more, I assume that the upstream firm has to pay C > 0 for each supply
contract. Thus, its profit function takes the following form:
pid = (p− w)D(p)−NC (4.3)
where N is the number of upstream firms from which the downstream firm
procures intermediate products.
The simple game has three stages. In the first stage, downstream firm
chooses the number of suppliers from which it procures the intermediary
product. In the second stage, upstream firms set quantities and, in the last
stage, a downstream monopolistic producer sets p and sells its product to the
final customers. The game is solved by backward induction. Thus, the price
of the final good is obtained by maximizing (4.3) with respect to p. This
yields the following FOC:
(p− w)D′(p) +D(p) = 0 (4.4)
Consequently, the monopoly’s price and quantities are p = 1+w2 and
D(p(w)) = 1−w2 . These values enter the profit functions of upstream firms,
which due to Cournot competition in the upstream market, set wholesale
price w = 11+N and quantity per firm qui =
1
2(1+N) . Substituting these values
into the profit function of the monopoly firm yields
pid =
N2
4(N + 1)2 −NC (4.5)
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Eventually, by maximizing the above function with respect to the number
of suppliers gives the following expression:
N
2(N + 1)3 − C = 0. (4.6)
The above expression illustrates the trade-off between the number of sup-
pliers and transaction costs. The first part of the equation shows how an
increase in the number of suppliers positively influences firm’s profit. This
effects comes from an intensified competition in the upstream market. How-
ever, the cost of dealing with upstream firms negatively influences the firm’s
payoff. Thus, the positive effect of ICT on the cost of interacting with suppli-
ers enables companies to use markets more efficiently, as it lowers search and
evaluation costs and gives access to a larger number of potential suppliers.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: A positive effect of ICT on the procurement cost
creates an incentive to increase the number of suppliers.
Although ICT lowers the overall cost of transaction, the cost of pro-
curement and thus the incentive to enlarge the supplier pool is also subject
to asset specificity, product complexity and the necessity for relationship-
specific investments. These factors increase the cost of coordination. To
illustrate this, let us assume that the transaction cost function is of the form
C(a) > 0, where C ′(a) > 0 and a > 0 represents a parameter of product
specificity and the need for relationship-specific investments. This parame-
ter can be interpreted in the following way: if the value of a is low, then input
products are of low specificity and no relationship-specific investments are
required. In contrast, if the value of a is high, the degree of asset specificity
is high. In particular, product complexity raises a variety of transaction
costs such as the coordination cost incurred when designing a component
and executing its production (Novak et al. 2001). Taking into account the
amount of time and effort that has to be invested in product design, the
buyer might prefer to restrict the number of suppliers or even choose sole
sourcing. In other cases, the buyer has to offer suppliers some incentives to
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make a relationship-specific commitment. One way of encouraging such com-
mitments is by reducing the number of alternative sources. Consequently,
the procurement of relationship-specific products lowers firms’ incentive to
increase the number of suppliers. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Transaction specificity is negatively correlated
with the number of suppliers.
The first hypothesis reflects the fact that, holding everything constant,
companies are likely to increase the number of suppliers in order to benefit
from upstream competition. The second hypothesis accounts for the fact that
the competition benefits are offset by transaction cost increasing with the
specificity of procured inputs. The net effect of the price and coordination
effect determine the final decision with respect to the optimal number of
sourcing options.
4.3 Data
The data used in this analysis stems from the e-Business W@tch 2006 sur-
vey (see www.ebusiness-watch.org). The main objective of the undertaking
includes monitoring the adoption, development and impact of electronic busi-
ness practices in different sectors of the European economy. The e-Business
W@tch surveys focus on the availability and usage of ICT and the perceived
importance and impact of e-business at the company level. Apart from the
numerous questions relating to the usage and relevance of ICT, all data sets
contain background information about each firm, e.g. sector, country of ori-
gin, number of employees, size class and number of establishments. Within
the 2006 survey, over 14,000 interviews were conducted that covered firms
from ten industries in 19 European countries. Table 4.3 in annex presents
the definition of the sectors according to the NACE Rev. 1.1. together with
the number of interviews conducted in each sector.
Despite a very comprehensive approach to the technology use and its im-
pact, the data collected by e-Business W@tch has some limitations. In par-
ticular, the observations are based on respondents’ perceptions which cannot
106
be verified. In addition, most of the indicators are reported on limited scales
such as yes/no or increase/decrease/stay the same. This considerably limits
the possibilities of a thorough analysis and the choice of the empirical meth-
ods that can be used. In addition, because all interviews were conducted
at one point of time, no direct causality effects can be established. Instead,
as in this study, one needs to use surrogates, which are again based on the
respondents’ perceptions. In spite of these limitations, e-Business W@tch is
an exceptional source of information on the diffusion, use and impact of ICT.
In particular, the large range of questions aiming at assessing the effects of
technology adoption on firm performance and behavior makes it suitable for
the study of ICT and its economic implications.
Below, I describe all variables used in the study. Detailed information
on the origins of the indicators can be found in annex. In particular, table
4.4 matches the variables with their counterparts in the survey questionnaire
and table 4.5 gives an overview of variables’ main statistics.
Dependent variable: Each respondent participating in the survey who
positively answered the question whether her company uses the internet or
other mediated networks to place orders for goods or services was asked how
electronic procurement affected the number of suppliers. Table 4.1 presents
firms’ answers to this question by sectors. Irrespective of the industry, the
largest share of firms did not see any change in the size of supplier pool
resulting from the introduction of the new transaction channel, i.e. over two
thirds of all firms. Only a small group of firms said that the deployment
of electronic sourcing was followed by a decrease in the number of suppliers
and, on average, 26% of all firms increased the number of suppliers after the
introduction of the new procurement technology and practices.
Because ICT enables firms to bundle procurement activities in order to
exploit economies of scale, most of the firms that have implemented sophisti-
cated electronic procurement schemes have the explicit target to streamline
their supplier base. A lack of the impact and the dominating move towards
more markets transactions is therefore somewhat surprising. This leads to
three conclusions. First, in general, the introduction of electronic procure-
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ment did not change companies’ sourcing behavior. Second, in contrast to
some prior predictions (e.g. Bakos et al. (1997)), a significantly larger group
of firms increased the size of their supplier pool, compared to those that re-
duced it. Lastly, there are extensive differences between industries regarding
the impact of ICT on the organization of economic activities. This sug-
gests that due to some inter-industry differences, the impact of ICT on the
organization of economic activities varies from sector to sector.
Table 4.1: The effect of e-sourcing on the number of suppliers by sector (in
%)
To explain the relationship between the new transaction mode and its
impact on the number of suppliers, in the proceeding analysis, I use a number
of variables that control for the effect of ICT on transaction costs, the use
of technology in the procurement process, procurement patterns and firms’
characteristics. Below, I define all explanatory variables in detail.
ICT and transaction costs: As discussed in Section 4.2, the abstract
nature of transaction costs makes including them in an empirical analysis
quite a challenging task (Joskow (1988)). A theoretical attempt to create
a model for assessing the impact of electronic procurement on purchasing
costs was made by Boer et al. (2002). Empirical testing requires, however,
concrete measures of market complexity and asset specificity, as well as a
means to assess when and how specific investments are important. With the
data at hand, it is not possible to quantify the effect of a new transaction
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mode on transaction costs. Thus, I use a variable that proxies the effect of
ICT on the procurement cost of supply goods. This indicator is based on the
answers to the question of what impact ICT had on the procurement cost of
supply goods. Respondents could choose between three options: (1) increase,
(2) decrease or (3) stay the same. It has to be noted, that the proxies should
not be confused with the effect of electronic procurement on input prices.
According to companies’ answers, (see table 4.5, annex), half of them
reported no effect of electronic procurement on the cost of procurement. If
there was any effect of the new transaction mode, it was rather positive.
Only 3% of all firms reported a negative impact of the new technology on
the procurement cost. Considering the nature of the technology, these results
do surprise and are consistent with the arguments presented above.
Asset specificity: As noted in previous section, the type of products
procured by companies might influence the transaction costs and, thus, the
organization of vertical relations and the choice of supply options. Hence,
there are five variables controlling for the following product groups that are
procured online: (1) maintenance, repair and operation (MRO) goods, (2)
raw materials, (3) intermediary products, (4) services and (5) all of these.
This product classification serve as approximations of asset specificity, i.e. it
is assumed that the MRO and raw materials are the least and intermediary
products and services are the most complex to procure online. The rationale
behind this assumption is that, in general, MRO goods and raw materials are
often standardized and available from multiple suppliers. Consequently they
are typically a starting point for online activities, as most of traders and plat-
forms offering these types of products offer electronic product catalogues or
other electronic order forms. In contrast, intermediary products and services
require considerable pre-transaction effort to define technical specifications
and other transaction terms of the contract. Due to these obstacles, they
are purchased online less often or at a lower scale than MRO goods or raw
materials. This is confirmed by the data as well. For example, on average,
MRO goods and raw materials are procured online around twice as often
as production inputs and services (see table 4.5, annex). This confirms the
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conjecture that MRO goods can be easier procured online indeed, compared
to direct production products. Thus, throughout the following analysis, I
assume that MRO goods and raw materials exhibit lower product specificity
and are more prone to be traded online, compared to intermediary inputs
and services. However, once again it has to be noted that these product
groups are a very crude approximation that does not account for a number
of factors. For example, in many industries and for a number of products,
the quality of raw materials is critical to such a degree that they are only pro-
cured from trusted suppliers and, hence, buyers will not change their input
source based only on cost arguments.
Distance to suppliers: Another variable related to the transaction
cost is the origin of suppliers. Concerning the origin of the supplier base,
electronic procurement is often perceived as an accelerator of international
trade. Thus, a high propensity of international online purchases would be
an indicator that electronic procurement eliminated barriers to international
trade and reduced transaction cost for cross-border business. If true, this
would give companies an incentive to increase the number of their sourcing
options. This, however, could be counter-balanced by the still persisting
differences in taxation and accounting rules and, in some sectors, regulation
requirements.
In the survey, companies were asked whether they buy online from na-
tional or international suppliers. It can be expected, that if a large share of
online transactions is conducted across borders, this might be an implication
of a positive impact of ICT on transaction cost. At the same time, however,
the geographical composition of electronic transactions might only reflect the
pattern of supply that was present before the introduction of electronic pro-
curement. This case is thus another example of the problem related to the
causality direction, which cannot be established with the current data.
Transaction economies of scale: Although the adoption of technolo-
gies that lower searching and filtering costs increases firms’ incentives to in-
crease the number of sourcing options (Mukhopadhyay et al. 2002), firms
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can take advantage from such technologies only when transaction economies
of scale are realized. In other words, to benefit from the introduction of a
new procurement mode, firms might need to maintain cooperation over a
longer period of time and carry out sufficiently many transactions per re-
lationship. This might be a reason why firms decide not to increase the
number of their suppliers or even decrease it, after the new technology and
procurement practices have been implemented (Clemons et al. 1995). Thus,
in order to control for the importance of the transaction economies of scale
in the process of defining a firm’s sourcing strategy, I use the following five
dummy variables that measure the share of goods bought online in the total
procurement: (1) less than 5%, (2) between 5% and 10%, (3) between 11%
and 25%, (4) between 26% and 50% and (5) above 50%.
ICT in the procurement process: To cast more light on the specific
use of ICT in the procurement process, four dummy variables are used. They
are based on companies’ answers to the questions on the use of ICT for such
activities as (1) finding suppliers in the market, (2) inviting suppliers to quote
prices or submit proposals, (3) ordering goods or services and (4) running
online auctions. Each variable takes value 1 or 0 if a firm uses an ICT tool for
the activities specified above. Due to the characteristics of these applications
and practices, it can be expected that all of them increase the probability of
a firm to increase its sourcing options.
Firm characteristics: In order to account for firms’ characteristics,
dummy variables controlling for company size and age are used. There are
four size categories ((1) less than 9, (2) 10-49, (3) 50-249 and (4) above 250
employees) and four age groups (founded in one of the following periods: (1)
before 1981, (2) between 1981 and ’86, (3) between 1987 and ’02 and (4)
2003 to ’06). Based on which company size class or age group a firm belongs
to, the relevant size and age dummy takes value 0 or 1.
111
4.4 Empirical analysis
4.4.1 Multinominal logit model
In the empirical part of the current analysis, I use a multinominal logit model
of the impact of electronic procurement on the supplier number in which the
dependent variable takes one of three values: (0) if the number of suppliers
decreased as a result of electronic procurement, (1) if it stayed roughly the
same and (2) if it increased. This approach is equivalent to estimating the
utility derived from each alternative state (Amemiya (1981)). In the follow-
ing, I assume also that each firm chooses the alternative sourcing strategy
that maximizes its utility. The total utility is a function of independent
variables specified in the previous section.
More formally, I assume that firm’s i utility from a change in the number
of suppliers following the introduction of a new procurement mode j, Uij, (i =
1, ..., n; j = 1, 2, 3) is a function of a firm’s characteristics and a stochastic
error. Thus, a possible representation of the problem at stake is:
Uij = α + βXi + i (4.7)
where Xi is a vector of a firm’s characteristics and i controls for unobserved
effects and is assumed to be independent from the explanatory variables
(Wooldridge (2003)). In the regression, I control for sector effects by includ-
ing a set of industry dummy variables and want to estimate β′s, i.e. variables’
coefficients.
The term α represents the baseline probability of reducing or increasing
the number of suppliers as a result of the decision to procure online. In
the context of the previous discussion, α might represent the ‘administrative
burden and costs’ of increasing the number of suppliers or the reduction of
upstream competition when a firm decides to procure from fewer suppliers,
other things equal. Thus, in both cases, α is expected to be negative.
Regarding the methodology used in this study, multinominal logit models
are widely applied and well understood (see e.g. Amemiya (1981), Dow et al.
(2004), Weeks (1997)). The main advantages of this type of models include
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the ease of estimation and the parametrization of the model characterized by
a high degree of flexibility. However, multinominal logit models suffer from
some limitations as well. Most notably, they rely on relatively restrictive
error distribution assumptions. Consequently, the models exhibit a problem
commonly known as "independence of irrelevant alternatives" problem. Fur-
thermore, the values of the coefficients are difficult to interpret. Thus, in or-
der to check the robustness of the empirical findings, I conducted an analysis
based on a multinominal probit model. Because the alternative specification
did not yield any qualitatively different results, in the next section, I report
the results of the multinominal logit estimation.
4.4.2 Results
Table 4.2 presents the regression results of the multinominal logit estimates
for the impact of electronic procurement on the number of suppliers. In both
cases, the model performs better than an empty model, i.e. without any vari-
ables. Further, it should be noted that the constant terms have a negative
effect on the probability of electronic procurement leading to an increase or
decrease in the number of suppliers. This casts some light on the general
approach towards procurement strategy and, given the specification of the
model, can be interpreted as an indirect measure of the administrative bur-
den companies incur by increasing the number of suppliers, or the forsaken
benefits of upstream competition in case of the reduction of the supplier
number. Thus, the negative values of the constant term for both specifica-
tions is consistent with the previous expectations. The remaining coefficients
provides an estimate of its impact on the dependent variable relative to this
baseline.
Regarding the effect of ICT on the cost of procurement, it can be seen
that it is equally important for an increase and decrease of the supplier num-
ber. Consistently with the theoretical predictions in section 4.2, positive
effect of ICT on transaction cost increases the likelihood of a firm increasing
the number of its sourcing option. The reverse can be observed when ICT
lead to an increase of the procurement costs. Paradoxically, however, the
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positive impact of ICT on the cost of procurement can increase the chances
of decreasing the number of suppliers as well. This new finding provides evi-
dence that lower transaction cost might not immediately lead to more market
transactions and, instead, companies might concentrate on a close coopera-
tion with fewer suppliers. An explanation of this phenomenon can be found,
for example, in Clemons et al. (1995) or Thompson (2004). They argue that
firms decide not to increase the number of their suppliers or even decrease it
after the new technology and procurement practices have been implemented.
According to them, companies that implement inter-organizational systems
and new procurement technologies benefit from reduced costs of information
exchange and processing, but they do not immediately switch to markets in
order to intensify competition between suppliers. Instead, such firms create
networks in which suppliers and buyers form closed business relationships
facilitated by ICT. Such behavior is most likely when products are char-
acterized by a high degree of complexity or when mutual investments are
required.
An analysis of the coefficient values of the variables controlling for the
use of ICT tools in the procurement process shows that out of four different
variables two increase the likelihood of electronic procurement having a pos-
itive impact on the number of suppliers. This allows to conclude that one of
the channels through which ICT allows firms to increase the number of their
sourcing options is the lower cost of searching and selecting new suppliers.
As indicated by the positive coefficient value of the variable controlling for
online procurement from international suppliers, the source of new suppli-
ers can lie outside of the buyer’s country. This allows for a conclusion that
electronic procurement might eliminate the barriers to the cross-border trade
and gives firms access to potential suppliers.
Regarding the share of online transactions in total procurement, there
results are not conclusive. In general, the more a firm procures through
electronic networks, the more likely it is to change the number of its sup-
pliers. The direction, however, is not clear. This finding combined with the
effect of ICT on the procurement cost confirms that the effect of electronic
procurement on firms’ sourcing strategies is not homogeneous.
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The effect of asset specificity on the supplier choice is unclear as well.
Only one coefficient is significant, i.e. the one controlling for procurement
of raw materials decreases the likelihood of a firm increasing the number of
suppliers. The lack of effect of the type of products ordered online on the
dependent variable can be attributed to the imperfection of the proxies for
the input complexity.
Turning to the variables controlling for firms’ characteristics, the change
in the number of suppliers varies with respect to firm size and age. Whereas
small and young firms are more likely to increase the number of suppliers,
their larger and older counterparts are more prone to reduce it. This puz-
zling finding can be explained by using the risk-augmented transaction cost
perspective presented by Kauffman and Mohtadi (2004). In their analy-
sis, they distinguish between three types of electronic procurement methods,
i.e. proprietary, open and hybrid platforms, and argue that each of them
has different implications for transaction cost and information uncertainty.
Whereas open systems offer the lowest transactions cost, they are associ-
ated with the highest information uncertainty and supply risk. The reverse
is true for closed systems. In their framework, firm size and uncertainty
are the source of the inability to correctly predict final demand and actual
supply. As a result, on the one hand, larger firms are more likely to adopt
costlier solutions, which offer them more certain-to-deliver value and, on the
other hand, smaller firms tend to choose applications, i.e. open platforms,
that minimize transaction costs, but whose use entails greater supply uncer-
tainties. This interpretation is additionally reinforced by the finding that the
positive impact of ICT on the cost of procurement is positively correlated
with a firm increasing the number of suppliers and that the negative impact
of ICT on the cost of procurement is more likely to be followed by a decrease
in the sourcing options.
4.5 Conclusions
The preceding analysis sought an answer to the question of how electronic
procurement affects the number of suppliers. Two observations motivated the
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Table 4.2: Multinominal logit estimates: the impact of e-procurement on the
number of suppliers
current analysis. First, there are contradicting predictions with respect to the
impact of ICT on firms’ sourcing strategies in general and the choice of the
number of sourcing options in particular (see, e.g., Malone et al. (1987) and
Clemons (1993)). Second, there is a lack of empirical evidence that would
support any of the way of thinking about the way electronic procurement
influences the number of suppliers. By using a unique data set that combines
information on the technology use and its impact, I show that there is no
single answer to the question at stake and that both regimes, i.e. move to
the market and move to the middle, coexist. What is more, however, most
of the firms covered by the survey did not see any effect of the introduction
of the electronic procurement on the number of their suppliers. If there was
any, it was positive, i.e. depending on the industry, at least one out of five
companies that procure goods online increased the number of their suppliers,
only around 6% of all firms covered in the sample reduced the size of their
supplier pool as a result of the new procurement technology and processes.
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The current analysis explains the prevailing move to the market by the
direct reduction of transaction cost and an indirect increase in upstream com-
petition spurred by ICT. However, lower transaction cost does not explain
the coexistence of different behavior with respect to the size of the supplier
pool. It seems that firm’s structural characteristics play a significant part
in what effect ICT has on their sourcing strategies. For example, whereas
relatively small and young companies report a positive impact of electronic
procurement on the number of supplier, their larger and older counterparts
seem to follow a different strategy. This indicates that the impact of ICT on
relationships with suppliers and customers is not alike for every company.
To explain this phenomenon, it is useful to take into account how supply
uncertainty and risk relate to different procurement technologies and, conse-
quently, to firms sourcing strategies. For example, by acknowledging the fact
that procurement systems are not alike, Kauffman and Mohtadi (2004) ar-
gue that they have different implications for transaction cost and supply risk
as well. Consequently, depending on their cost and risk preferences compa-
nies might choose different procurement technology together with sourcing
strategy. As a result, because firm size and uncertainty are the source of
the inability to correctly predict final demand and actual supply, large firms
are more likely to adopt costlier solutions and fewer suppliers. By doing so,
they increase the certain-to-deliver value. At the same time, smaller and
cost-oriented firms choose open applications that offer them more sourcing
options and, hence, lower transaction costs, but whose use entails greater
supply uncertainties.
The above results confirm the intuitive expectation that when facing dif-
ferent economic conditions and structural characteristics, companies adopt
ICT tools for different strategic reasons that, in turn, have different implica-
tions. An immediate inference is that any further research aiming at iden-
tifying the impact of ICT on the organization of economic activities should
concentrate on comparable groups of firms, operating in homogeneous eco-
nomic environments. Furthermore, in the research on the impacts of ICT
there is a need to account for different characteristics of various technolo-
gies and the very context in which they are applied in order to obtain a
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complete picture of the ICT impact on firm boundaries and organization of
economic activities. Consequently, the study offers some interesting insights
contributing to the debate on the impact of ICT on firm boundaries and the
organization of economic activity. In particular, the investigation is limited
to an analysis of one particular ICT applications, i.e. electronic procurement,
and it uses indicators that focus only on this technology and its impact on
selected issues. This contrasts a number of other empirical studies that aim
at assessing the effect of technology on sourcing strategy or vertical relations
between firms and, as a result, provides novel results with respect to the
impact of electronic procurement on sourcing strategy and the organization
of vertical relations in supply chain.
Despite delivering some novel insights, the study suffers from some lim-
itations. In particular, the variables merely mirror the perceptions of the
respondents and cannot be verified. Relying on ‘personal’ judgements of the
respondents, raises the question of the credibility of the answers and the
subjectivity of the expressed views makes it difficult to define exactly what
influenced what. Furthermore, the imperfections of the measure used in the
study lead to strict assumptions with respect, for example, to the measure-
ment of transaction cost or the level of product complexity and the type of
goods that companies procure online. Unfortunately, these constraints do
not apply only to this study. Such abstract concepts as transaction cost, as-
set specificity or relationship-specific investments are very difficult to define
and, what is more, to measure. Consequently, the type of empirical data
and approach taken in this study can be one of only few ways to study the
problems similar to the one analyzed in the current work.
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4.6 Annex
Table 4.3: Population coverage of the e-Business Watch 2006 survey
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Table 4.4: Variables and survey questions and answers
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Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics
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